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Common Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission:  
Testing the Meta-theories 
 
Kimberly D. Krawiec∗ & Kathryn Zeiler∗∗ 
 
 
 
One of the most hotly debated questions under the common law is under what 
circumstances an individual has a duty to disclose relevant information unknown to the 
person with whom she bargains. Dozens of law review articles and treatises and over 
1000 cases explore this vexing question of when and what a contracting party must 
disclose to her counterparty, even in the absence of explicit misleading statements.  
Although one frequently encounters statements that, absent a fiduciary or confidential 
relationship, an individual need never disclose all that she knows to her bargaining 
partner, this is best construed as mere rhetoric by courts, rather than an accurate statement 
of law.1  Even a cursory examination of the cases reveals, instead, that courts require full 
disclosure in some circumstances, but not in others. 
Determining what circumstances will lead courts to intervene to correct disparities in 
knowledge between bargaining parties, however, has proved problematic.  Courts 
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Carolina.  Email: krawiec@email.unc.edu.  We thank workshop participants at the University of Virginia, 
Georgetown University, the University of Southern California, and Lewis & Clark law schools, audience 
members and fellow panelists at the 2004 Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, Scott Baker, Jeff 
Bauman, Bill Bratton, Caroline Brown, Steve Choi, Heidi Li Feldman, Matthew Gerke, Steve Goldberg, 
Michael Gottesman, David Grether, Mitu Gulati, Michael Heise, Vicki Jackson, Melissa Jacoby, Ed Kitch, 
Don Langevoort, David Luban, Paul Mahoney, Anup Malani, Geoff Manne, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, John 
Mikhail, John Orth, Mitt Regan, Bob Scott, Warren Schwartz, Gerry Spann, and Dan Tarullo for helpful 
comments on early drafts of this Article. We are also grateful to Rob Bartilucci, Joshua Ellis, Bill Forstner, 
Kevin Pooler, and Mark Siler for outstanding research assistance. 
∗∗ Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Email: kmz3@law.georgetown.edu. 
Web: http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/kmz3/.   
1 See, e.g., Arthur Linton Corbin, 3 Corbin on Contracts §597 (1960) (explaining that, “[s]tatements are 
exceedingly common, both in texts and in court opinions, that relief will not be given on the ground of 
mistake unless the mistake is ‘mutual.’ Such a broad generalization is untrue.” ); Anthony T. Kronman, 
Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. Leg. Studies 1, 6 (1978) (stating that, “[i]n 
the past, it was often asserted that, absent fraud or misrepresentation, a unilateral mistake never justifies 
excusing the mistaken party from his duty to perform or pay damages.  This is certainly no longer the law, 
and Corbin has demonstrated that in all probability it never was.”); French v. Vining, 102 Mass. 132, *3 
(1869) (stating that “[i]t is sometimes rather loosely said that mere silence, on the part of the vendor, as to a 
known defect, does not amount to a fraud. But this is far from being universally true.”);  Heritage Ins. Co. 
of America v. First Nat. Bank of Cicero; 629 F.Supp. 1412, 1415 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (stating that “no duty of 
disclosure exists absent a fiduciary duty or public trust between parties to a transaction”). 
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repeatedly reach divergent results in similar, or even seemingly identical, cases, and have 
failed to articulate a coherent or generally accepted rule as to when a duty of candor will 
be imposed on parties to an arm’s-length transaction.   
As a result, numerous legal commentators have analyzed the law of fraudulent silence 
(also referred to as actionable nondisclosure or actionable silence) in an attempt to 
identify some guiding principle that will rationalize the cases and lend some 
predictability to the question of under what circumstances a person legally is permitted to 
exploit her superior knowledge to the detriment of those with whom she transacts.  
Although some commentators point to various specific factors (such as, for example, 
whether the withheld information related to a latent defect or whether the litigating 
parties were in a confidential or fiduciary relationship) that courts look to either alone or 
in some combination in deciding cases, others conclude that no useful rule of law can be 
found in the cases.2  Still other legal scholars, most notably Anthony Kronman and Kim 
Lane Scheppele, reject the notion that narrow doctrinal rules motivate fraudulent silence 
decisions and instead advance meta-theories (based, respectively, on whether courts seek 
primarily to further economic efficiency or fairness) in an attempt to untangle the cases 
and illuminate the law of fraudulent silence.3 
2 Deborah A. DeMott, Do You Have the Right to Remain Silent?: Duties of Disclosure in Business 
Transactions, 19 Del J. Corp. L. 65, 66 (1994) (stating that “[m]y thesis is that legal doctrine does not 
resolve these scenarios in a symmetrical fashion”); George Spencer Bower, The Law Relating to 
Actionable Nondisclosure and Other Breaches of Duty in Relations of Confidence and Influence, v-vi 
(1915) (arguing that the law of actionable nondisclosure cannot be “fit . . . into the rigid framework of a 
code.” ) (quoted in Kim LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON 
LAW 112 (1988) ); Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790-1860: Continuity Amidst Change, 39 Am. J. 
Legal Hist. 405, 407 (1995) (discussing the law of fraud, including the law of fraudulent silence, and noting 
that, “there does not seem to be any factor which accurately predicts which policy a particular court will 
find determinative in a particular case, other than the merits of the case”). 
3 See, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 2 at 119-124 (advocating an equality of access approach to explain the 
law of actionable nondisclosure); Kim Lane Scheppele, It’s Just Not Right: The Ethics of Insider Trading, 
56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 125 (1993) (same); Kronman, supra note 1 at 13-15 (arguing that the law of 
actionable nondisclosure is best explained by the law’s desire to reward those who have expended time and 
effort to acquire the undisclosed information); Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law of 
Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 337 (1997) (arguing that the law of actionable nondisclosure as applied 
to buyers is best explained through a deontological philosophy); Aland Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral 
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It is these meta-theories – along with the famous Supreme Court Case of Laidlaw v. 
Organ4 – that inspired this project.  In Laidlaw, Organ had been bargaining over the price 
of 111 hogsheads of tobacco with Laidlaw’s agent, Francis Girault, on the evening of 
February 18, 1815, but did not reach an agreement on price before departing.  During the 
night, three gentlemen who had been with the British fleet came ashore with news that 
the Treaty of Ghent had been signed, ending the war of 1812 and lifting the blockade of 
the port of New Orleans.  One of these men was the brother of Organ’s business partner 
(who had a one-third interest in the profits of the tobacco) and informed Organ of the 
news during the night. 
Although the news of the war’s end was to be published in a handbill at eight a.m. 
the next morning, shortly after sunrise on the morning of the 19th, Organ returned to 
Girault and purchased the tobacco without disclosing the news.5  A few hours later, the 
news was released and the price of tobacco rose by thirty to fifty percent.   
In a short – but famous -- opinion, Justice Marshall ruled that Organ had no duty to 
disclose his knowledge of the end of the war to Girault.6  Due to the cryptic nature of 
Marshall’s opinion, however, commentators have struggled to identify the principle 
underlying the decision.  In the process, several theories have emerged that purport to 
explain not only the Court’s decision in Laidlaw, but the large and seemingly inconsistent 
body of other fraudulent silence cases as well.   
Unfortunately, many of these authors discuss a limited number of cases that they 
believe support their asserted theory, without providing evidence that the chosen cases 
 
Principal in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 375 (1999) (justifying insider trading regulation 
on a deontological theory of “equitable disclosure”).  
4 15 U.S. 178 (1817). 
5 15 U.S. at 182-83.  Apparently, Girault asked Organ “whether there was any news which was calculated 
to enhance the price or value of the article about to be purchased.”  Id. at 183.  The lower court determined 
that there was no evidence that Organ’s reply “suggested anything to the said Girault, calculated to impose 
upon him with respect to said news,” and directed the jury to find for Organ.  Id. at 183-84. 
6 15 U.S. at 194.  Marshall did, however, remand to the lower court for a jury determination regarding 
Organ’s response to Girault’s inquiry.  Id. 
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are representative, and without distinguishing cases that do not support their theory.7  
This Article represents the first attempt to study empirically the factors that cause courts 
to impose disclosure duties on bargaining parties in some circumstances, but not in 
others.8 
We use data coded from 466 decisions spanning over a wide array of jurisdictions and 
covering over 200 years. The results are mixed. In some cases our data support the 
conventional wisdom relating to common law disclosure duties. For example, our data 
support the claim that courts are more likely to require the disclosure of latent, as 
opposed to patent, defects. In addition, courts are more likely to require full disclosure 
between parties in a fiduciary or confidential relationship.  
On the other hand, our results cast doubt on much of the conventional wisdom 
regarding the law of fraudulent silence. Indeed, our results challenge ten of the most 
prominent theories that have been asserted to explain when courts will require disclosure. 
We find that courts are no more likely to impose disclosure duties when the information 
is casually acquired as opposed to deliberately acquired, and that unequal access to 
information by the contracting parties is not a significant factor that drives courts to find 
a duty to disclose. We do find, however, that when these two factors are present 
simultaneously courts are significantly more likely to force disclosure. Perhaps most 
interestingly, although it is generally understood that courts have become more likely to 
impose disclosure duties over time, we find that courts actually have become less likely 
over time to find that the informed party owed the uninformed party a duty to disclose. 
 
 
7 See generally, Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (2002) (criticizing 
the methodology of much legal empirical research). 
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I. MOTIVATION BEHIND OUR SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 
 As previously discussed, court rulings seem to conflict in a large number of 
fraudulent silence cases, causing commentators to struggle for an underlying principle to 
explain the disparate outcomes of seemingly identical cases.  Some of the variation in the 
cases may arise from the fact that several distinct bodies of common law often bear on 
the same transaction, including contract, tort, equity, and restitution.9 Even accounting for 
this, however, courts seem to decide fraudulent silence cases in an unusually inconsistent 
and fact-specific manner. 
Story’s observations notwithstanding, the question of when and what a contracting 
party must disclose to her partner has confounded legal theorists since ancient times.  For 
example, in De Officiis, Cicero attempts to tackle the problem by constructing a series of 
hypotheticals in which one party to a transaction has information that the other does 
not.10  He then creates an imaginary dialogue in which the Stoic philosophers Anipater 
and Diogenes debate whether morality mandates disclosure by the knowledgeable 
party.11 
 
8 One prior attempt to systematically study the cases is Dalley, supra note 2.  Although Professor Dalley’s 
study is not a statistical analysis of the cases, her article is an important contribution to the literature and 
her findings are discussed throughout this Article.   
9 DeMott, supra note 2 at 66.  In particular, the intersection of tort and contract law in these cases raises 
some interesting questions.  Typically, plaintiffs successfully alleging that they were induced to enter a 
transaction through their counterparty’s fraudulent silence on a material point might either proceed under 
contract law and rescind the transaction, or sue under tort and recover damages. See, e.g., Justice v. 
Anderson County, 955 S.W.2d 613 (1997) (stating that, “[a]n individual induced by fraud to enter into a 
contract might elect between two remedies. He might treat the contract as voidable and sue for the 
equitable remedy of rescission or he might treat the contract as existing and sue for damages at law under 
the theory of deceit.”).  See also,  DeMott, supra note 2 at 67.  
On the other hand, some courts hold that a tort claim cannot be based on the same facts serving as 
the basis for a breach of contract claim.  Accordingly, plaintiffs alleging actionable nondisclosures in the 
formation of a contract must sue under contract law, and are prohibited from suing in tort.  See, e.g., 
Heidtman Steel Products, Inc. v. Compuware Corp., 164 F.Supp.2d 931, 939 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
Today, this problem is further exacerbated by the various state and federal statutes that also govern 
the required disclosures in some transactions, such as the federal securities acts, state commercial codes,  
and state laws mandating disclosures in particular transactions, such as real estate and automobile sales, and 
health care delivery. 
10 Cicero, On Moral Obligation (De Oficiis) , ¶51 (John Higginbotham, tr., 1967). 
11 Id. at ¶¶51-60.  Cicero argues that morality requires a duty of full candor in all instances. 
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 In the thirteenth century, the subject received the attention of such eminent figures 
as Saint Thomas Aquinas, who argued for a surprisingly restrictive view of disclosure 
duties.12  Writing in the mid-1700s, the French legal theorist and Roman law expert R.J. 
Pothier gave extended treatment to the subject of fraudulent silence in his Treatise on the 
Contract of Sale.13  Finally, disclosure duties – and the doctrine of fraudulent silence, in 
particular -- seemed to enjoy special attention from both civil and common law scholars 
during the nineteenth century, perhaps due to the great economic changes taking place 
during that time (and the accompanying legal changes that might be expected).14 
 Even the numerous sections of the various restatements of the law dealing with 
the issue lend little guidance.  For example, Section 153 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts states that “[w]here a mistake of one party at the time a contract was made as to 
a basic assumption on which he made the contract has a material effect on the agreed 
exchange of performances that is adverse to him, the contract is voidable by him if . . . 
the other party had reason to know of the mistake.”15  Although the restaters provide 
several illustrations in an attempt to clarify this statement, they provide little guidance as 
to what constitutes a “basic assumption” or a “material effect,” leaving courts wide 
latitude to apply the rule on a case-by-case basis.16  
 Although Section 161 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts seems to provide 
the most concrete guidance as to which factors lead courts to impose a duty on bargaining 
12 R.J. Pothier, Treatise on the Contract of Sale , Art. I, No. 238 (L.S. Cushing, tr., 1839) (stating that Saint 
Thomas would permit “the seller to conceal the defects of the thing, except in two cases, namely; 1, when 
the defect is of such a nature that it might cause some damage to the buyer; and, 2, when the seller takes 
advantage of such concealment to sell the thing for more than it is worth.”) Pothier at Art. I, Nos. 237-38.   
See also, Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, 179-180 (1977) 
(discussing the movement away from the sound price rule). 
13 Horwitz, supra note 12. 
14 See, e.g., Edward H. Wilson, Concealment or Silence as a Form of Fraud, and the Relief or Redress 
Afforded Therefor, Both in Law and in Equity, The Counselor 230 (1895); Horwitz, supra note 12 at 173-
201 (discussing the response of contract law to changing market and economic conditions); GULIAN C. 
VERPLANCK, AN ESSAY ON THE DOCTRINE OF CONTRACTS (1825); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON 
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1877); JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1828). 
15 Restatement of  Contracts (2d) §153. 
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parties to disclose material information, it too falls short of clearly specifying all of the 
circumstances under which one party owes another a duty to disclose.. For example, 
Section 161 lists some cases in which the court will impose a duty to disclose: when the 
information would update or correct previous assertions, when the parties are in a 
confidential or fiduciary relationship, and when the information relates to a latent 
defect.17  However, the section also specifies that disclosure is required when one 
contracting party knows that the other is operating under a mistake as to a “basic 
assumption.”  Although the illustrations provide several examples of what constitutes a 
basic assumption, section 161 suffers from the same lack of clarity that characterizes the 
other Restatement sections dealing with the issue of fraudulent silence, leaving courts 
with wide latitude when applying the rule. 
 In summary, the law of fraudulent silence has confounded scholars and practitioners 
for many years. Given this historical lack of guidance that persists to this day, using a 
large sample of randomly selected cases we set out in the following Section to investigate 
systematically whether particular factors significantly influence courts when they decide 
whether informed parties have duties to disclose information to uninformed parties.  
 
16 Id.  Other Restatement treatments of the duty to disclose at common law include: Restatement of 
Restitution §12; Restatement of Torts (2d) §551; and Restatement of Contracts (1st) §472(1)(b). 
17 In particular, Section 161 states that a person’s nondisclosure is equivalent to an assertion (and therefore 
actionable) only: 
 
“(a) where he knows that disclosure of the fact is necessary to prevent some previous 
assertion from being a misrepresentation or from being fraudulent or material. 
(b) where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party 
as to a basic assumption on which that party is making the contract and if non-disclosure 
of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with  reasonable 
standards of fair dealing. 
(c) where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party 
as to the contents or effect of a writing, evidencing or embodying an agreement in whole 
or in part. 
(d) where the other person is entitled to know the fact because of a relation of trust and 
confidence between them. 
 
Restatement of  Contracts (2d) §161.  Furthermore, the Comments and Illustrations detail several other 
instances when disclosure will be required, including when the undisclosed information relates to a latent 
defect.  Id. At Illustration 3.d (stating that, under certain circumstances, “[a] seller of real or personal 
property is, for example, ordinarily expected to disclose a known latent defect. . . .”) 
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II. COLLECTION OF HYPOTHESES AND CONSTRUCTED INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
 
This study examines a number of independent variables and their relationship, if any, 
to courts’ decisions to impose liability for fraudulent silence.  The variables, all of which 
are detailed in this section, include twenty variables related to case characteristics, which 
can be divided into five general classes: the type of information that was undisclosed, the 
type of transaction in which the parties were engaged, how the undisclosed information 
was acquired, the characteristics of the uninformed party, and the behavior of the 
informed party. The case decision year and the geographic region and jurisdiction of the 
court deciding the case are also included as independent variables. 
A. The Type of Information 
Commentators frequently assert that the imposition of disclosure duties is 
dependent on the type of information in question.  In particular, it has been claimed that 
courts give special treatment to intrinsic information, information relating to personal 
intentions or opinions, information relating to latent defects, information concerning a 
defect likely to cause bodily injury or property damage, and information that would have 
updated or corrected previously disclosed information. 
1. The information was intrinsic, as opposed to extrinsic or market, 
information 
 
It has been argued by some commentators that courts distinguish between 
intrinsic facts, which relate directly to the subject matter of the transaction, and extrinsic 
facts, which relate to the market conditions or environment affecting the subject matter of 
the transaction, and require the disclosure of intrinsic facts only.18  Joseph Story 
explained the distinction as follows: 
 
 
18 Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence §210 (12th ed. 1877); 2 James Kent, 
Commentaries on American Law, 377 (1827) (noting that, “[t]here may be some difference in the facility 
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 Intrinsic circumstances are properly those which belong to the 
nature, character, condition, title, safety, use, or enjoyment, &c., of the 
subject-matter of the contract; such as natural or artificial defects in the 
subject-matter.  Extrinsic circumstances are properly those which are 
accidentally connected with it, or rather bear upon it, at the time of the 
contract, and may enhance or diminish its value or price, or operate as a 
motive to make or decline the contract; such as facts respecting the 
occurrence of peace or war, the rise or fall of markets, the character of the 
neighborhood, the increase or diminution of duties, or the like 
circumstances.19 
 
To illustrate, in the previously discussed case of Laidlaw v. Organ,20 Justice 
Marshall ruled that “the intelligence of extrinsic circumstances, which might influence 
the price of the commodity, and which was exclusively within the knowledge of the 
vendee,” need not be disclosed to the vendor. 21  In Laidlaw, the information concerning 
the end of the war of 1812 and the consequent lifting of the blockade of the port of New 
Orleans was extrinsic information, because it did not pertain to conditions solely 
affecting the tobacco exchanged between Organ and Laidlaw, but instead pertained to 
conditions affecting the market for and price of all tobacco being shipped from New 
Orleans.  Accordingly, it could be argued that Justice Marshall permitted nondisclosure in 
that case because the undisclosed information was an extrinsic fact.  If it had been an 
intrinsic fact, according to this theory, disclosure would have been required. 
Other commentators, however, argue that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction 
provides, at best, only a partial explanation. It thus has been argued that, although 
disclosure has been required more often with respect to intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, 
facts, the better explanation for such rulings is that intrinsic facts may not be readily 
 
with which the rule [of disclosure] applies between facts and circumstances that are intrinsic, and form 
material ingredients of the contract, and those that are extrinsic, and form no component part of it, though 
they create inducements to enter into the contract, or affect the price of the article.”); Pothier, supra note 12 
at Art. III, No. 242 (noting that, “there is no doubt, that . . . a buyer is not entitled to complain, that the 
seller has not informed him of circumstances extrinsic to the thing sold, however much he may be 
interested in knowing them”). 
19 Story, supra note 18 at § 210. 
20 15 U.S. 178 (1817).  See supra notes 4 - 6 and accompanying text. 
21 15 U.S. at 194 (emphasis added).  
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discoverable by the uninformed party, whereas extrinsic facts are,22 or that extrinsic facts 
are normally the result of a deliberate search, whereas intrinsic facts are often casually 
acquired.23  In addition, it has been argued that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction cannot 
adequately explain the results in all of the cases, particularly those where the uninformed 
party is the purchaser, as opposed to the seller.24  Finally, it has been argued by some 
observers that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction has been replaced in modern 
jurisprudence with other theories of disclosure duties and is no longer relevant to court 
decisions concerning the degree of candor required of contracting parties.25  We thus 
predicted that in earlier years courts were more likely to rule that a duty to disclose 
existed in cases involving intrinsic information, but that this effect narrowed in 
significance over time and finally disappeared altogether.   
2. The undisclosed information concerned personal intentions or opinions 
Although the distinction between opinion and fact is not always clear, 
commentators seem to agree that failures to disclose personal opinions or intentions are 
not actionable.26  This rule is sometimes referred to as a distinction between personal and 
general information, or between individual and common facts.27  As stated by Gulian 
Verplanck: 
22 See W. Page Keeton, Concealment and Nondisclosure, 15 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1936); Scheppele supra 
note 2 at 128-29. 
23 Kronman, supra note 1 at 17-18 (arguing that market information is typically, though not always, 
acquired through deliberate search.) 
24 Keeton, supra note 22 at 21. 
25 Scheppele, supra note 2 at 128-29. 
26 See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 12 at 263 (stating that misstatements of opinion were not actionable at 
common law, the rationale being to prevent judicial incursion into the private bargaining process.)  See 
also, Dalley, supra note 2 at 409 (listing reasons for the rule that statements of opinion are not actionable, 
including difficulties of proof and the fact that such statements were too common to be reasonably relied 
on) and at 419 (arguing that statements of intention are not actionable).   Two long-standing exceptions to 
this rule exist: first, disclosure of expert opinions is normally required, and second the doctrine of 
promissory fraud requires the disclosure of an intention to breach. 
27 See, e.g., Gulian C. Verplanck, An Essay on the Doctrine of Contracts: Being An Inquiry How Contracts 
Are Affected in Law and Morals by Concealment, Error, or Inadequate Price 119-20 (1825); Paula J. 
Dalley, From Horse Trading To Insider Trading: The Historical Antecedents of the Insider Trading 
Debate, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1289, 1328 (1998). 
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My knowledge of my own interests, and my personal necessities, 
my sagacity, natural or acquired, in forming judgments of the state of the 
market; in brief, all that has been above summed up as constituting the 
facts and reasoning of a bargain, peculiar to each individual, can never be 
expected by the other party to be communicated . . . .28 
 
To illustrate, Verplanck hypothesizes a director of a large insurance company who 
believes, from his observations and knowledge of the insurance industry and his own 
institution, that the insurance business is “overdone” and that current premiums are an 
inadequate compensation for the risks assumed by insurers.29  If he sells his insurance 
stock to a purchaser with less knowledge of the industry than he, the director is under no 
duty to disclose his opinion (with which other informed parties might reasonably 
disagree) that the stock is overpriced.30  If, on the other hand, the undisclosed information 
concerns losses in the insurance company that have depleted half its capital (a verifiable 
fact), disclosure would be required.31   
Although we predicted that courts are less likely to find that the informed party 
owed the uninformed party a duty to disclose when the withheld information related to a 
personal opinion or intention, we also predicted that such cases were relatively rare, 
given the widespread agreement among commentators that such information is not 
required to be disclosed. In addition, as regards allegations of a failure to disclose 
personal opinions, there is a second reason to predict that these sorts of cases are rare. 
Because most opinions are founded on underlying facts, we predicted that well-plead 
suits generally allege fraudulent nondisclosure of these facts, rather than of the opinion 
itself. In other words, because plaintiffs (or, more accurately, their counsel) should plead 
28 Verplanck, supra note 27 at 119. 
29 Id. at 121-22. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 122. Verplanck’s hypothetical could also be explained on the grounds that courts distinguish 
between intrinsic and extrinsic facts, or that the parties lack equal access to information regarding the lost 
capital, whereas information regarding the general state of the insurance industry is  theoretically available 
to everyone. Similarly, Professor Paula Dalley illustrates the common law rule regarding the disclosure of 
personal intentions through the example of a horse trade.  Dalley, supra note 2 at 128.  In her example, the 
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those claims that have some chance of success, we predicted that relatively few cases 
alleging a failure to disclose a personal opinion would be present in our dataset.  Instead, 
plaintiffs intent on increasing their chances of success should plead a failure to disclose 
the underlying facts on which the opinion was based.32 
3. The undisclosed information related to a latent defect 
One of the most common theories employed by commentators to explain the 
results in nondisclosure cases concerns the difference between latent and patent defects.  
As with so many of our variables, commentators seem to agree that there is a greater duty 
to disclose latent, as opposed to patent, defects, but disagree as to the rationale for the 
distinction.33 
In order to distinguish the concept of latent defect from that of unequal access to 
information, we employ the term “latent defect” narrowly in this article, as a term of art.  
Accordingly, as defined here, only property (including slaves) can be subject to a latent 
defect – the term does not apply to all undisclosed and difficult to access information.34  
For example, an undisclosed illness or injury affecting a person would not qualify as a 
latent defect in an application for insurance or employment, but would constitute a latent 
 
fact that the horse seller shortly plans to leave town and is thus willing to accept any price for the horse is 
personal information that need not be disclosed.  Id. 
32 To illustrate, consider the case of Bob, whose brother is a member of the town counsel that has just 
approved a new highway through what was previously farm land.  If Bob, aware of these plans, buys a tract 
of farm land in the area of the proposed highway from Sally without disclosing this information, Sally has 
several options.  First, she could allege that Bob failed to disclose his opinion that prices of farm land 
would soon rise.  Alternatively, she could allege that Bob failed to disclose his knowledge of the proposed 
highway gained from his brother.  Due to the widespread agreement among commentators that a failure to 
disclose personal opinions is not actionable, we predicted relatively few cases of the first type, as plaintiffs 
have the option of pleading the latter type of case and, according to commentators, are more likely to meet 
with success in this manner. 
33 Compare, e.g., Kronman, supra note 1 at 25 (arguing that requiring sellers to disclose latent – but not 
patent -- defects is an economically efficient policy because sellers typically casually acquire information 
regarding latent defects and because requiring the disclosure of obvious defects increases transaction costs) 
with Scheppele, supra note 2 at 134-37 (arguing that the distinction between latent and patent defects is 
best justified on the grounds that latent defects are typically inaccessible to one of the parties – generally 
the buyer.) 
34 See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing fraudulent silence in slave sales). 
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defect in the sale of a slave.35 Similarly, in a stock transaction, the fact that the issuer is 
about to become the subject of a takeover bid, thus raising the stock price significantly, 
would not be considered a “defect,” although the information is certainly relevant to the 
transaction and would greatly affect the purchase price. Consistent with the assertions of 
legal scholars, we predicted that courts are more likely to impose disclosure duties when 
the withheld information relates to a latent defect.  
4. The information concerned a defect likely to cause bodily injury or 
property damage 
 
It has been argued that the law traditionally has taken a stricter view with regard 
to information that, if disclosed, could prevent the occurrence of bodily injury or property 
damage, as opposed to information that, if disclosed, would avoid mere economic loss.36  
The distinction seems defensible from an economic standpoint, as there may be 
circumstances when it would be inefficient for the law to correct an economic loss of one 
party (such as, for example, in some circumstances when the informed party has 
expended time and effort to acquire the information), whereas the same efficiency 
argument cannot generally be made with regard to the prevention of bodily injury or 
property damage. 
For example, in older cases, courts may require the disclosure of information 
concerning the presence of small pox or other dangerous germs, which, if known by the 
uninformed party, could have prevented the contraction and spread of the disease.37  
35 Compare Huntington v. Brown, 17 La. Ann. 48 (1865) (sale of diseased slave coded as latent defect); 
Smith v. Rowzee, 10 Ky. 527 (1821) (same) with Leclerc v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,  93 N.H. 234, 
39 A.2d 763 (1944) (illness in applicant for insurance not coded as latent defect). In both cases, however, 
information regarding the undisclosed injury or illness might be accessible to only one party, meaning that 
the parties had unequal access to the information. 
36 Keeton, supra note 22 at 14-17, 36.  Apparently, this reasoning dates back at least to the time of St. 
Thomas Aquinas.  Aquinas argued that vendors should be required to reveal defects in the good sold if “the 
vice be of a nature to cause the vendee some injury.”  See Pothier, supra note 12 at Art. I, No. 238 
(criticizing Aquinas’s restrictive view of disclosure duties). 
37 See, e.g., Leech v. Husbands, 152 A. 729, 733 (Del. Super. Ct. 1930) (failure of landlord to disclose that 
residence was "infested with vermin, bugs and disease germs” constituted fraud, although tenant waived 
right to relief by failing to sue within reasonable time after discovering defect);  Cowen v. Sunderland, 145 
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Modern examples may include the duty of tobacco companies to disclose the health risks 
associated with cigarette smoking38 and the duty of sellers of real property to disclose the 
presence of asbestos or lead paint.39  Because this rule seems sensible from a policy 
perspective and can be traced back at least to the fourteenth century, we predicted that, 
when the failure to disclose information is likely to cause physical injury or property 
damage, courts are more likely to rule that a duty to disclose exists.  
 
5. The information would have updated or corrected previously disclosed 
information40 
 
Mass. 363, 364, 14 N.E. 117, 118 (1887) (stating that “[i]t has thus been held that where one lets premises 
infected with the  
small-pox, and injury occurred thereby, he was liable if, knowing this danger, he omitted to inform the 
lessee”).  See also, Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 865 (8th Cir. 1903) (stating that, 
“[a] manufacturer or vendor, who, without giving notice of its character or qualities, supplies or delivers to 
another a machine or article which, at the time of delivery, he knows to be imminently dangerous to the life 
or limbs of any one who may use it for the purpose for which it is intended, is liable to any one who 
sustains injury from its dangerous condition, whether he has any contractual relations with him or not.”) 
38 Congress probably pre-empted any state common law duties of cigarette manufacturers to disclose the 
health risks associated with smoking tobacco with the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 
1965, as amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.  Together, these statutes provide 
that, “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with 
respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity 
with the provisions of this chapter.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (1965).  The Supreme Court has held that these 
statutes pre-empt state law claims based on a failure to disclose material health risks to consumers through 
advertising or promotion. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). In theory, claims based on 
a failure to disclose through other channels the health risks associated with smoking are not preempted.   
C.f. Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,  884 F.Supp. 1515, 1521 (D. Kan. 1995) (refusing to dismiss 
plaintiff’s fraud claim alleging that “the defendants knew that use of their products caused cancer and 
vasculatory disease, yet willfully chose to conceal those facts from the public,” and noting that “it is 
possible that plaintiff can assert viable claims” of fraud at trial.) 
39Kezer v. Mark Stimson Associates, 742 A.2d 898, 903 (Me. 1999) (applying  a Maine law that requires 
the disclosure of the existence of all hazardous material including asbestos and lead based paint); Stanley J. 
Levy, Asbestos and the Real Estate Industry the Legacy of the Magic Mineral, 339 Practicing L. Inst. 7,30 
(1989) (stating that because of its dangerous qualities a duty to disclose the known existence of asbestos 
may be found).  But see, Justice v. Anderson County, 955 S.W.2d 613 (1997) (finding that the purchasers 
of a school building were not entitled to rescind the sales contract on the grounds that the property’s 
vendors -- the county and school district -- fraudulently concealed the presence of asbestos in the building, 
when the building was purchased “as is” at a public auction, the transaction was arm's length, there was no 
fiduciary relationship between the parties, and the presence of asbestos was reasonably discoverable by 
purchasers).    
40 Although many courts and commentators discussing the common law of nondisclosure do not distinguish 
between the duty to update and the duty to correct, federal courts and commentators applying or discussing 
the federal securities laws consider the distinction important, particularly as not all courts recognize a duty 
to update under the federal securities laws. See, Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken 
Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 87, 118 (1999) (noting that the second and third 
circuits recognize a duty to update “forward looking” information under some circumstances.)  
The court in Oran v. Stafford explained the distinction between the duty to update and the duty to 
correct well: “The duty to correct exists ‘when a company makes a historical statement that, at the time 
made, the company believed to be true, but as revealed by subsequently discovered information actually 
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A duty to correct may arise if a statement is false when made, although the 
speaker believes the information to be correct.  If the speaker subsequently discovers that 
the information earlier disclosed was false, he may have a duty to correct that 
information. 
 By contrast, a duty to update may arise if a statement is correct when made, but 
later developments subsequently render the statement incorrect or misleading.  A duty to 
update the previously correct statement might arise in some cases.41  Section 551 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes both a duty to correct and a duty to update, by 
stating that a party to a business transaction is under an obligation to disclose 
“subsequently acquired information that he knows will make untrue or misleading a 
previous representation that when made was true or believed to be so.”42  We predicted 
that cases involving information that would have updated or corrected previously 
disclosed information were more likely to result in a finding that the informed party owed 
the uninformed party a duty to disclose. 
B. The Type of Transaction 
Commentators have also asserted that the degree of required disclosure depends on 
the type of transaction in question.  In particular, it has been asserted that courts require 
heightened disclosure in the case of transactions between parties in a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship, transactions concerning the acquisition of insurance, surety, or a 
release from liability, transactions in which the parties have unequal access to 
 
was not.’ The duty to update, in contrast, ‘concerns statements that, although reasonable at the time made, 
become misleading when viewed in the context of subsequent events.’” Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 286 
(2000) (citations omitted). 
We coded the duty to update and the duty to correct together, rather than separately, due to the 
difficulty of distinguishing one from the other, particularly in cases where the court did not distinguish 
between the two, or confused the two issues. 
41 Wilson, supra note 14 at 236 (stating that, “where one party has made a material misrepresentation which 
is true at the time, but which subsequently, to his knowledge, but not the knowledge of the other, becomes, 
through the alteration of circumstances, untrue, it is his imperative duty to communicate to the other 
information of the change in affairs.”) 
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information, transactions concerning the transfer of real property, and transactions 
concerning the sale or transfer of a slave. 
1. A transaction between parties in a confidential or fiduciary relationship 
The most commonly asserted basis for the imposition of a duty to disclose 
material information is the presence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship between 
the parties to the transaction.43  Technically, confidential relationships (or “relationships 
of trust and confidence” as they are typically labeled) differ from fiduciary relationships 
in that a fiduciary relationship arises out of the position of the parties relative to each 
other, while a confidential relationship arises from the conduct of the parties or from the 
nature of the transaction that is the subject of the dispute.44  For purposes of this article, 
however, the distinction is irrelevant.  Our hypothesis is that both types of relationships 
lead to greater disclosure requirements than do arms-length relationships, and 
accordingly, we make no attempt to distinguish fiduciary relationships from those that are 
merely confidential. 
Unfortunately, although the fiduciary character of some relationships is clear -- 
such as principal and agent, corporate officer or director and shareholder, or trustee and 
beneficiary -- the fiduciary or confidential nature of other relationships is not so clear, or 
 
42 Rest. 2d Torts §551(2)(c). 
43 See, e.g., Story, supra note 18 at §218; Bay Colony, Ltd. v. Trendmaker, Inc. 121 F.3d 998 (5th Cir. 
1997) (stating that Texas law recognizes a duty to disclose which supports action for fraud by 
nondisclosure only where fiduciary or confidential relationship exists); Banque Arabe et Internationale 
D'Investissement v. Maryland Nat. Bank, 57 F.3d 146 (2nd Cir. 1995) (holding that an affirmative duty to 
disclose arises from the need to complete a partial statement or from a fiduciary or confidential relationship 
between the parties). 
44 For example, the relationship between two family members may or may not be confidential depending on 
factors such as whether they typically entrust confidential information to one another or whether they enjoy 
a congenial relationship. In contrast, because of the status of a trust manager as a fiduciary to the trust 
beneficiary, the trust manager owes the trust beneficiary a fiduciary duty that cannot be diminished through 
daily interactions that suggest the relationship is not one of trust and confidence. See, George Gleeson 
Bogert, Confidential Relations and Unenforceable Express Trusts, 13 Cornell L. Q. 237, 248 (1928) 
(discussing the difference between confidential and fiduciary relationships); Richard W. Painter, Kimberly 
D. Krawiec, & Cynthia A. Williams, Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O’Hagan, 
84 Va. L. Rev. 153, 176-177, n.101-03 (1998) (same). 
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might vary from state to state or across the time frame of our study.45  In fact, courts have 
purposely failed to provide an exhaustive list of fiduciary relationships, preferring instead 
loose standards that allow judges to consider the specific facts of each case.46  In order to 
avoid the difficulties and subjective decisions that could lead to errors in coding such 
cases, we adopted bright-line rules that suit the purposes of our study, but might not 
technically conform to the law. 
For example, the traditional common law rule was that corporate officers and 
directors owed fiduciary duties only to the corporation itself or to the shareholders as a 
unit, and not to the individual shareholders of the corporation.47 Accordingly, courts often 
ruled that officers and directors could trade with shareholders based on material non-
public information without disclosing such information.48  On the other hand, some 
courts, often invoking the “special facts” doctrine, refused to permit such transactions by 
corporate officers and directors without full disclosure.49  Because fiduciary obligations 
45 A common (but not exhaustive) list of recognized fiduciary relationships would include: executors, 
guardians, trustees, attorneys, and, to an extent, corporate directors and senior executives.  See, John C. 
Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the 
Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 117, 150 (1981).  
46 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 45 (stating that, “[t]he common law has in fact, always defined the term 
[fiduciary] with deliberate imprecision . . . .”); Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney's Place in 
the Family of Fiduciary Relationships, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 15 (2001)  ("A clear characterization of fiduciary 
obligation is elusive and its exact nature is much debated.");   Harper v. Adametz, 113 A.2d. 136, 225 
(Conn. 1955) (stating that the court has purposefully refrained from defining a fiduciary relationship in 
precise detail that would exclude new situations). 
47 Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. 371 (1847) (stating that, “[t]here is no legal privity, relation, or immediate 
connection, between the holders of shares in a bank, in their individual capacity, on the one side, and the 
directors of the bank on the other. The directors are not the bailees, the factors, agents or trustees of such 
individual stockholders.”); Allen v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 456 (1857) (holding that “the directors of the bank are 
the agents of the bank. The bank is the only principal, and there is no such trust for, or relation to, a 
stockholder as has been claimed by the plaintiff.”); Board of Com'rs of Tippecanoe County v. Reynolds, 15 
Am. Rep. 245 (1873) (stating that directors owe the shareholders as a unit a fiduciary duty when dealing 
with the corporation’s business or property, but that no such duty is owed by an officer or director to an 
individual shareholder when transacting for the purchase or sale of stock in the corporation). 
48 Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir. 1979) (stating that, [a]bsent fraud, the traditional common 
law approach has been to permit officers and directors of corporations to trade in their corporation's 
securities free from liability to other traders for failing to disclose inside information.”); Adams v. Mid-
West Chevrolet Corp., 179 P.2d 147, 156 (1946) (stating that, “[t]he general rule is that officers and 
directors . . . cannot deal with the property of the corporation for their own personal benefit or advantage. 
But this duty does not extend to the outstanding stock of the corporation for the reason that such stock is 
the individual property of the respective shareholders and not in any sense the corporation's property”). 
49 Freeman, supra note 48 at 191 (stating that, [a] few jurisdictions now require disclosure where certain 
"special facts" exist, and some even impose a strict fiduciary duty on the insider vis-à-vis the selling 
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to individual shareholders were not recognized at this time, some commentators have 
used these cases as evidence that courts apply an equality of access doctrine to determine 
when disclosure will be required.50   
We believe, however, that such cases are better understood as a precursor to 
today’s doctrine of officer and director fiduciary duties rather than as evidence of a broad 
insistence by courts that parties to transactions have equal access to information. We thus 
coded these cases as fiduciary duty cases (in addition, in most instances, as unequal 
access cases), despite the fact that the court might not have invoked this rationale, and 
might even have specifically rejected it. 
Similarly, whether some relationships are confidential in nature vary from state to 
state or with the specific circumstances of the relationship.  An examination of the law 
governing marital relations helps to illustrate the point.  Some states consider marriage an 
inherently fiduciary relationship while others hold that marital relations might or might 
not be confidential, depending on the circumstances.51  Some states hold that a fiduciary 
or confidential relationship automatically begins with engagement, while others do not.52 
 
shareholder.”); Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909) (stating, “[t]hat the defendant was a director of the 
corporation is but one of the facts upon which the liability is asserted, the existence of all the others in 
addition making such a combination as rendered it the plain duty of the defendant to speak”).  Those other 
facts included that Rapide owned 75% of the stock of the company, was administrator general of the 
company, was the chief negotiator for the company in talks that eventually led to the sale of all of the 
company’s property, and was in reality acting as an agent for all of the other shareholders in such 
negotiations. Id. 
50 See, e.g., Strong, supra note 49 (holding that agents of Repide, the chief shareholder and director of the 
Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, should have disclosed to prospective sellers of the 
company’s shares that they were acting on behalf of Repide, who was also the company’s chief negotiator 
for a U.S. government contract); Scheppele, supra note 2 at 113-114 (arguing that the Court’s ruling in 
Strong v. Repide is explainable on equal access grounds, and not on fiduciary duty grounds, because the 
court explicitly rejected the proposition that corporate directors owe shareholders special disclosure 
obligations.) 
51 Compare, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 
(1992) (finding that marriage is not per se a fiduciary relationship) with DeLorean v. DeLorean, 511 A.2d 
1257, 1261-62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986) (finding that marriage is a fiduciary relationship). 
52 Compare, e.g., In re Marriage of Sokolowski, 597 N.E.2d 675, 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding that a 
confidential relationship begins at engagement under Illinois law), and Lightman v Magid, 54 Tenn. App. 
701, 394 S.W.2d. 151 (1965) (finding that a confidential relationship ordinarily exists at engagement),  with 
Handley v Handley, 113 Cal. App. 2d. 280, 248 P.2d. 59 (1952) (holding that confidential relationship 
could not exists prior to marriage) 
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And courts differ in the extent to which they treat married but separated persons as 
parties to a confidential or fiduciary relationship.53   
To avoid the daunting task of mastering the intricacies of the law of confidential 
relations in all fifty states, as well as the necessity of subjective judgment calls 
concerning whether the circumstances of a particular relationship make it confidential, 
we adopted bright-line rules that reflected the weight of authority and applied them 
across all jurisdictions.  We thus, for example, treated engaged persons negotiating a 
prenuptial agreement as parties to a confidential relationship in all 50 states, despite the 
fact that this is not the law in all jurisdictions under all circumstances. This bright-line 
approach did not trouble us, given our hypothesis that, despite asserted differences across 
jurisdictions in the law of confidential relations, as a general matter, courts impose a 
heavier disclosure obligation in cases where the relation between the parties could be 
considered fiduciary or confidential, such as, for example, a familial or marital 
relationship, than they do when the parties share a merely arms-length relationship.  We 
thus predicted a significant, positive relationship between the likelihood of the court 
imposing disclosure duties and the existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship. 
2. The transaction concerned insurance, surety, or a release from liability 
Professor W. Page Keeton described this theory best:  “In releases, in contracts of 
insurance, and in contracts of suretyship, practically all facts affecting the matter must be 
disclosed.”54  The most commonly asserted rationale for this rule, particularly as regards 
53 Compare, e.g., Harroff v. Harroff, 398 S.E.2d 340, 343 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that married 
persons owe each other fiduciary duties while negotiating a separation agreement) with In re Marriage of 
Auble, 866 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that married persons living apart do not owe each 
other fiduciary duties in the negotiation of a separation agreement).  
54 Keeton, supra note 22 at 36; Wilson, supra note 14 at 231.  But see, Scheppele, supra note 2 at 148 
(arguing that when the insurer and insured have equal access to information, disclosure is not required.)  
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insurance, is that the insured is likely to have knowledge affecting the contract that is 
unavailable to the insurance underwriter.55  
Some modern commentators have urged the abolition of the rule of full disclosure 
in insurance contracts on the grounds that the rule originated in the context of maritime 
insurance, when vessels were typically insured once they were already at sea and could 
not be inspected.56  Accordingly, they argue that such rules have no place in modern 
insurance practice, in which the insurance company is typically able to and does conduct 
a thorough inspection of the insured property or person.57  Nonetheless, we predicted that 
courts are more likely to find a duty to disclose when the transaction concerns the 
acquisition of insurance, surety, or a release from liability. 
3. The transaction was one in which the parties had unequal access to 
information 
 
One of the most lasting, if controversial, theories seeking to explain why courts 
require disclosure of all material facts in some transactions but not others is the theory 
that courts will require disclosure whenever the parties have unequal access to 
information (the “equality of access theory”).58  Professor Kim Lane Scheppele has 
elegantly defined equal access in terms of both structural equality and equality of 
55 Scheppele, supra note 2 at 146-148; Verplanck, supra note 27 at 37-38 (stating that, “[t]he insured being 
the party from whom, in most cases, the underwriter obtains the special facts upon which the calculation of 
the risk is settled . . . [e]very fact within his knowledge, regarding which ignorance or mistake might 
possibly induce the underwriter to compute his risk upon an incorrect basis . . . is considered by the law as 
a material fact, and misrepresentation or suppression of it avoids the policy.”)  But see, Kronman, supra 
note 1 at 27 (explaining the rule that health or life insurance applicants owe the insurer a duty of full candor 
on the grounds that information regarding the health of the applicant is nearly always casually acquired).  
56 See, e.g., Bertram Harnett, The Doctrine of Concealment: A Remnant of the Law of Insurance, 15 L. & 
Contemp. Probs. 391-414 (1950).  
57 Id. 
58 Am. Jur. 2d §148 (asserting that, “[t]here is abundant authority to the effect that if one party to a contract 
or transaction has superior knowledge, or knowledge which is not within the fair and reasonable reach of 
the other party and which he could not discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or means of 
knowledge which are not open to both parties alike, he is under a legal obligation to speak”); Victor 
Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. 
L. Rev. 322 (1979) (defining equality of access as an informational advantage that cannot be overcome by 
the uninformed party, regardless of her diligence or monetary resources.); Carter v. Boehm, 3 Burr. (1905) 
(opinion of Lord Mansfield, stating that “either party may be innocently silent as to grounds open to both to 
exercise their judgment upon.”); Wilson, supra note 14 at 234 (stating that, “the common law imposes no 
duty of disclosure where the facts suppressed are equally accessible to both parties to the transaction.”)  
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aptitude.  For example, she states that “[t]wo actors will be said to have equal access to 
information if they (1) have equal probabilities of finding the information if they put forth 
the same level of effort and (2) are capable of making this equivalent level of effort.”59   
People most often have different probabilities of information detection because of 
structural inequality – in other words, they “have structurally unequal access to 
knowledge.”60  In contrast, when two people are unable to expend the same level of effort 
in information production, it is most often because one does not even realize that the 
information might exist, or is too lacking in intellectual capability or social knowledge to 
compete with more sophisticated parties.61  
Relying on Laidlaw to underpin her theory, Scheppele points to Justice Marshall’s 
dictum that “[i]t would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine [i.e., the doctrine 
that the relative access of the parties to the information is legally relevant] within proper 
limits, where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties” to develop 
an argument that the case outcome can be explained by the fact that the parties had equal 
access to information.  This assumption might seem surprising, given the clear evidence 
that, due to Organ’s special connection to the only three people in New Orleans with 
knowledge of the end of the war, Laidlaw could not have discovered the information 
without expending considerably more effort than that exerted by Organ.  However, 
Scheppele argues that Organ’s discovery of the information was purely fortuitous – 
Laidlaw was just as likely as Organ to have a partner with a brother aboard the British 
fleet who came ashore during the night with news that the war had ended.62 
 Despite the admirable efforts of Professor Scheppele, the equality of access 
theory remains extraordinarily open-ended and subjective, a fact leading many critics, 
59 Scheppele, supra note 2 at 120. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 121.   
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including one of the present authors, to dismiss the test as providing no meaningful 
guidance for courts.63  Needless to say, reasonable minds can wildly differ on what 
constitutes equal access and coding for a factor so susceptible to personal interpretation 
was difficult. 
Nonetheless, we attempted to address the problem by laying down bright-line 
rules.  Most importantly, in contrast to Scheppele, we defined access as purely structural.  
Even gross differences in education or knowledge did not impact our determination of 
whether equality of access was lacking.  Instead, we dealt with differences such as these 
by including a separate code for parties who are illiterate, elderly, severely ill, or 
extraordinarily mentally deficient in some way (although still competent to contract).64 
Furthermore, we did not, as some commentators might, automatically code 
purchasers and sellers of real or personal property as having unequal access to 
information.  Instead, if a casual inspection of the property would have revealed the 
undisclosed information, then we concluded that the parties had equal access to the 
information in question, despite the fact that purchasers must have sellers’ permission 
before inspecting the property.  We felt that this definition was reasonable, given the ease 
with which the purchaser could request and execute such an inspection, and the suspicion 
that should arise in the purchaser’s mind if the seller refuses the request. This equality of 
access theory leads us to predict that courts are more likely to impose disclosure duties 
when the parties have unequal access to the withheld information. 
 
62 Id. at 122 (stating that, “ [i]t seems that Organ got his information through a friend who had a brother in 
the know.  Laidlaw’s agent, if he had had the same fortune, also could have got the information this way.”) 
63 For example, one of the present authors has argued previously that, because both individual aptitude and 
structural access vary across the population in relation to wealth and education, no two people are ever 
truly equal.  Instead, access is a continuum on which cases of clear inequality or relative equality can be 
identified at the extremes, but that none of the definitions endorsed by the equality of access advocates 
gives meaningful guidance as to where to draw the line in the large majority of cases, which fall in the 
middle of the continuum. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency & Insider Trading: Deconstructing 
the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95  Nw. U.L. Rev. 443 (2001); Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, 
Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 313 (2002) (raising a similar argument). 
64 See infra note 92and accompanying text (discussing this variable). 
  
 23
                                                          
4. The transaction concerned the transfer of real property 
It has been argued by some commentators that courts impose a greater duty of 
disclosure with regard to the transfer of real property than in other types of transactions, a 
rule that apparently dates back to the Roman civil law.65  At common law, this rule might 
have been the result of implied warranties of habitability and title.66 In many states today, 
much of the common law in this area has been superceded by statutes that mandate high 
levels of disclosure in real estate transactions, particularly residential ones.  We predicted 
that courts are more likely to impose a duty to disclose when the transaction concerns the 
transfer of real property. 
5. The Transaction Concerned the Transfer of a Slave 
Slavery cases of all kinds have understandably generated significant interest not only 
in the legal literature, but in history and economics as well.67  Although one might expect 
that courts would formulate different disclosure rules in slave sale cases than in other sale 
of goods cases, in recognition of the fact that the property at issue is a human being, a 
review of the cases should quickly disabuse the reader of that notion.   
For example, courts could have used the rule that bargaining parties have a duty to 
disclose defects likely to cause personal injury as a basis for imposing a duty to disclose 
any illness or injury in a slave, the rationale being that lack of disclosure prevents the 
purchaser from seeking medical attention for the slave. Instead, however, courts of the 
65 See, e.g., Cicero, supra note 10 at ¶65 (stating that, “[a]s far as estates are concerned, it is laid down in 
our civil law that all faults known to the seller be declared at the time of the sale.”)  See generally, John V. 
Orth, Sale of Defective Houses, 6 Greenbag 163 (2003) (discussing the common law of disclosure in 
connection with the sale of real property). 
66 As to title, see Pothier at Art. II, No. 240 (declaring that the vendor must declare “that the thing does not 
belong to him; that it does not belong to him irrevocably; or that it is subject to certain charges, annuities 
(rentes), or special hypothecations.”) 
67 See, e.g., Jenny B. Wahl, The Jurisprudence of American Slave Sales, 56 (1) J. Econ. Hist. 143 (1996); 
Helen T. Catterall, Judicial Cases Concerning American Slavery and the Negro (1968); Andrew Fede, 
Legal Protection for Slave Buyers in the U.S. South: A Caveat Concerning Caveat Emptor, 31 (4) Am. J. 
Legal Hist. 322 (1987); Judith K. Shafer, Guaranteed against the Vices and Maladies of Precribed by Law: 
Consumer Protection, the Law of Slave Sales, and the Supreme Court in Antebellum Louisiana, 31 (4) Am. 
J. Legal Hist. 306 (1987); Judith K. Schafer, Slavery, the Civil Law, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana 
(1994); Mark Tushnet, New Histories of the Private Law of Slavery, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 301 (1996).  
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era deciding disclosure issues seem to have treated slaves much like any other personal 
property.68   
This is not to say, however, that special disclosure rules did not arise in connection 
with slavery cases.  In fact, economic and legal historians have argued that, although the 
southern states generally observed a rule of strict caveat emptor much more frequently 
than did the northeastern states, due to the importance of the slave trade to the southern 
economy, southern states attempted to regulate the slavery market, in part by imposing 
disclosure duties on parties to a slave sale.69  Interestingly, this rule too dates back to 
Roman law.70  We predicted that courts are more likely to find that the informed party 
has a duty to disclose when the transaction involves the sale of a slave.  
C. How the Information Was Acquired 
 Many commentators have argued that the method by which the undisclosed 
information was acquired has an impact on whether courts require disclosure of the 
information.  Specifically, it has been asserted that courts more frequently require the 
disclosure of casually acquired information, and information acquired through illegal or 
tortious means. 
1. The information was casually, as opposed to deliberately, acquired 
68 In fact, the argument that illness or injury in a slave falls within the well-recognized exception for 
disclosures of defects likely to cause bodily injury was not raised in any of the cases in our dataset, 
presumably because of the deeply ingrained notion among many southerners of that era (including judges 
and counsel in the cases) that the southern legal system treats slaves as goods, rather than as individuals 
whose well-being should be protected by the legal system.  See also, Wahl, supra note 67 at 146, n.7 
(referring to livestock sales as slave sales’ “closest relative”). 
69 See, e.g., Wahl, supra note 67 at 146-148 (arguing that southern courts imposed higher disclosure 
obligations in slave sales than in other sales transactions); Fede, supra note 67 at 322-58 (arguing that slave 
sales were more heavily policed by the courts, who imposed protections such as warranties of titles and 
soundness, foreshadowing the development of the UCC).  But see, Dalley, supra note 2 at 430 (finding less 
protection of buyers against fraud in slave cases than in some other types of cases, such as those involving 
land, horses, and corporate securities.) 
70 Cicero, supra note 10 at ¶71 (stating that “[i]t is not only in the sale of real estate that civil law, which is 
based on the natural law, condemns trickery and fraud, but also in the case of slave-purchase the buyer is 
protected by law against deception.  Indeed, an edict of the aediles lays down that if the seller knows that 
the slave is a weakling, a runaway or a thief, he must (except in the case of an inherited slave) declare it”). 
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Although the notion that the law should reward those who expend time and effort 
to acquire information by permitting them to reap the benefits of bargaining with others 
without revealing that information was propounded perhaps most eloquently (and 
certainly most famously) by Anthony Kronman, this economic justification for the 
differing results in fraudulent silence cases is, in fact, one of the earliest theories offered 
by legal commentators attempting to explain the law of fraudulent silence.  For example, 
in De Officiis, Cicero constructs a hypothetical in which a merchant sails to Rhodes from 
Alexandria with a shipment of corn during a time of great famine in Rhodes.71  The 
merchant knows that other ships have set sail from Alexandria to Rhodes with enough 
corn to alleviate the famine and will arrive shortly.  In an imaginary dialogue, the Stoic 
philosophers Antipater and Diogenes debate whether or not the merchant should be 
required to reveal all that he knows.72   
Discussing the hypothetical in his 1761 Treatise on Obligations, the French legal 
theorist R.J. Pothier agrees with Cicero’s conclusion that the merchant should disclose his 
secret information.  He acknowledges, however, that the majority of other writers on the 
subject have considered the merchant’s profits to be made by nondisclosure, “not an 
unjust profit; but a just reward for the diligence which enabled him to arrive the first, and 
the risk which he ran of losing his merchandise, if any of the accidents, to which he was 
exposed, should have prevented his arrival on time.”73  Similarly, writing in 1936, 
Professor W. Page Keeton argued that the manner in which the informed party acquired 
her information is relevant to courts’ determinations of disclosure duties, noting that, 
“[t]he information might have been acquired as a result of his bringing to bear superior 
71 Cicero, supra note 10 at ¶ 50. 
72 Cicero, supra note 10 at ¶¶ 51-53.  In the hypothetical, Antipater argues that, “he should tell everything, 
so that the buyer can be just as much in possession of the facts as the seller.”  Id. at ¶51.  Diogenes 
responds that, “these bonds [of social unity] are not such that a man may not have anything to call his own.  
If that is so, there is not even any selling to be done, only giving.” Id. at ¶ 53. 
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knowledge, intelligence, skill, or technical judgment,” or “it might have been acquired by 
mere chance.”74 
Kronman elaborated on this theory by arguing that the seemingly inconsistent 
results in similar cases involving the nondisclosure of relevant facts could be reconciled 
by noting that when nondisclosure is permitted, the knowledge involved is typically the 
result of a deliberate search.75  Although Kronman conceded that Organ’s information 
appeared to be acquired fortuitously, rather than deliberately (recall that Organ’s business 
partner’s brother had been at sea with the British fleet and arrived in New Orleans during 
the middle of the night, tipping Organ about the soon-to-be-disclosed news of the war’s 
end), he believed that this did not undermine his theory.  Instead, Kronman argued that 
Marshall’s decision resulted from an attempt to lay down a blanket rule concerning the 
disclosure of market information, which is typically, though not always, deliberately 
acquired. 
Kronman argued that a rule permitting silence in such instances was a sensible 
economic policy, as it represented the only effective means of providing incentives for 
the production of costly information that would not normally be discovered, absent a 
deliberate search.76  Requiring the disclosure of casually acquired information, by 
 
73 Pothier, supra note 12 at Art. III., No. 242.  Pothier, although agreeing with Cicero’s conclusions, also 
notes that, “[t]he decision of Cicero meets with much difficulty even in the forum of conscience. The 
greater number of those who have written upon natural law have regarded it as going too far.”  Id.  
74 Keeton, supra note 22 at 25.  See also, Wilson, supra note 14 at 231 (stating that, “the common law . . . 
declares that men should as a general rule take care of themselves, and that some incentive to diligence and 
discretion in their affairs should be afforded, by giving them, in ordinary transactions, the benefit of their 
industry and discernment.”); Hays v. Meyers, 107 S.W. 287, 288 (1908) (stating that a party has no duty to 
disclose “the superior knowledge of property he desires to purchase that has been acquired by skill, energy, 
vigilance, and other legitimate means” and stating further that “[i]f any other rule were adopted, it would 
have a depressing tendency on trade and commerce by removing the incentive to speculation and profit that 
lies at the foundation of almost every business venture”).  
75 Kronman, supra note 1 at 9.  Although Kronman limited his theory to “socially productive information,” 
we find this distinction unnecessary to test his hypothesis.  In practice, it is difficult to conceive of 
examples of failures to disclose socially unproductive information that would result in demonstrable 
damages to the plaintiff, thus resulting in litigation and written judicial opinions.   
76 Id. 
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contrast, should not alter the informed party’s discovery of information, because he 
expended no resources to find it. 
Like Kronman, we define “deliberately acquired information” as “information 
whose acquisition entails costs which would not have been incurred but for the 
likelihood, however great, that the information in question would actually be 
produced.”77  The costs of acquiring such information might include not only direct 
search costs, but also the costs of developing any needed expertise, such as, for example, 
the costs of attending business school or studying the values of art or antiques.78   
Casually acquired information, by contrast, is information the acquisition of 
which entails costs that would have been incurred even if the information were not 
forthcoming.79  To illustrate, a businessman who overhears information while riding on a 
bus has acquired the information casually, except in the unlikely event that he rides buses 
specifically for that purpose.80 
Kronman recognized that, although theoretically interesting, the determination as 
to whether or not any given piece of information was deliberately or casually acquired in 
any instance was a difficult one for courts to make in the real world.81  Accordingly, he 
argued that, rather than making case by case determinations as to the manner of 
information acquisition, it would be more efficient for courts to adopt blanket rules 
regarding whether the kind of information involved in a particular class of case (say, real 
estate purchases, or the sale of a good with a latent defect) was more likely to be 
generated deliberately or casually.82 
77 Id. at 13. 
78 Id. at 13. 
79 Id. at 13. 
80 Id. at 13, n.38 and accompanying text. 
81 Kronman, supra note 1 at 13-14. 
82 Kronman, supra note 1 at 17-18. 
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In contrast, we judged whether information was casually or deliberately acquired 
based on the facts of each case, as opposed to the class of case in question.  We did this 
for several reasons.  First, although Kronman does discuss general rules as to the likely 
means of information acquisition in certain classes of cases (for example, market 
information, the knowledge of purchasers and sellers of real property, and information 
relating to the health of an applicant for health or life insurance), he did not lay down 
general classifications for every possible range of facts.  Accordingly, any attempt to 
apply blanket rules would have required significant fact-specific inquiry on our part in 
order to create such rules for all classes of cases contained in our sample set.   
Second, coding individual cases on their own facts enabled us to test not only the 
robustness of the deliberately/casually acquired distinction, but also allowed us to test 
Kronman’s empirical claims as to the likely mode of information acquisition in those 
classes of cases for which he did, in fact, suggest blanket rules.  In other words, coding in 
this manner permitted us to judge, for example, whether extrinsic information is really 
typically deliberately acquired, as contended by Kronman.  
Other commentators disagree that the deliberately/casually acquired information 
distinction is a meaningful predictor of the outcomes of fraudulent silence cases.83  Our 
own view embarking on this project was that, regardless of whether Kronman’s theory 
was sound from an economic policy perspective, it was difficult to apply in practice and 
had not been embraced by courts outside the Seventh Circuit.84  As a result, we predicted 
no significant relationship between whether the information was casually acquired and 
the likelihood that a court would impose disclosure duties. 
83 See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 2 at 68-69, 85; Scheppele, supra note 2 at 124-26. 
84 The influence of Judges Easterbrook and Posner in the Seventh Circuit, their embrace of law and 
economics principles, and their familiarity with academic theory led us to this hypothesis.  See, e.g., 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 
1056 (1990) (Judge Posner, opining that a seller had a duty to disclose material information obtained 
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2. The information was acquired through illegal or tortious means 
Courts and commentators often take the position that information acquired by 
illegal or tortious means must be disclosed to a contracting counterparty.85  A standard 
example is that if A trespasses upon B’s land and while there conducts a test and 
determines that oil is located on the land, if A subsequently purchases the land from B 
without disclosing to B the presence of oil on his land, B might have a right to rescind the 
contract.86  We predicted that courts are significantly more likely to find a duty to 
disclose when the information is acquired by illegal or tortious means. 
D. Characteristics of the Uninformed Party 
 Commentators frequently assert that court rulings are influenced by certain 
characteristics of the uninformed party.  Specifically, we hypothesized that courts require 
disclosure more frequently when the uninformed party is a buyer or lessee, when the 
uninformed party is female, and when the uninformed party is sick, disabled, illiterate, 
elderly, or otherwise severely disadvantaged in the bargaining relationship, although still 
competent to contract. 
1. The uninformed party was the buyer or lessee 
Commentators seem to agree that sellers have a higher obligation to disclose 
information affecting the value of the transaction than do purchasers, although they 
disagree as to why courts make this distinction.87  Professor Keeton explained the rule as 
follows:  
 
“without substantial investment . . . which the buyer would find either impossible or very costly to discover 
himself”). 
85 See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 22 at 25-26; George Spencer Bower & Sir Alexander Kingcome Turner, 
The Law of Actionable Misrepresentation 107 (3rd ed. 1974); Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the 
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 Ohio St. L. J. 1223, 
1291-92 (1998); Mallon Oil v. Brown/Edwards Associates, 965 P.2d 105, 111-112 (Colo. 1998) (holding 
that information acquired illegally must be disclosed).   
86 Keeton, supra note 22 at 26; § 161 Restatement of Contracts (2d), Illustration d.11 (stating that 
information acquired through trespass must be disclosed). 
87 See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 1 at 22-23 (buyers have lesser disclosure obligations than sellers because 
buyers are likely to acquire their information deliberately, whereas sellers are more likely to acquire their 
  
 30
                                                                                                                                                                            
The buyer is not ordinarily expected to disclose information greatly 
affecting the value of the property which is the subject-matter of the sale, 
whereas the seller is expected to disclose defects in the property sold 
which greatly decrease the value of the property.88 
 
We predicted that courts are significantly more likely to impose disclosure duties when 
the uninformed party is the buyer. 
2. The uninformed party was female 
Historically, courts and legislatures have used a variety of theories to limit the 
rights of women to freely contract.  For example, in the early twentieth century, courts 
upheld laws designed to improve working conditions for women and children against 
challenges based on interference with the freedom of contract – challenges that had been 
used successfully to invalidate similar laws that applied to men.89   
Sometimes, the limitations on women’s freedom of contract were explicit, as 
under the doctrine of coverture, which treated the family as a unit and the husband as the 
 
information casually); Scheppele, supra note 2 at 130-33 (sellers have greater disclosure duties than do 
purchasers because sellers are more likely to have access to the information in question, whereas 
purchasers are not); William B. Goldfarb, Fraud & Nondisclosure in the Vendor-Purchaser Relation, 8 
Western Reserve L. Rev. 5, 26 (1956) (arguing that sellers have disclosure duties that exceed those of 
buyers because buyers rarely have material information unavailable to sellers); DeMott, supra note 2 at 76 
(stating that “buyers in many settings are able to withhold with impunity information comparable to 
information that a seller is obliged to disclose.”); Pothier, supra note 12 at Nos. 294-98 (stating that 
vendees have lesser disclosure obligations than vendors, because the vendor ought to be aware of the value 
of what he sells.); Andrew Kull, Unilateral Mistake: The Baseball Card Case, 70 Wash. U. L.Q. 57, 62 and 
n.7 (1992) (arguing that sellers are more often found to have a duty to disclose material information 
unknown to the buyer, because sellers are subject to implied warranties, whereas buyers are not). 
88 Keeton, supra note 22 at 35-36. 
89 Compare, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding unconstitutional a state law regulating 
working hours) with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (upholding a Washington 
state statute setting minimum wages for women only); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding 
an Oregon statute establishing maximum working hours for women, but not for men); Commonwealth v. 
Hamilton Manufacturing Company, 120 Mass. 383 (1876) (upholding a Massachusetts statute prohibiting 
the employment of women and persons under the age of eighteen in any manufacturing establishment for 
more than sixty hours per week); Wenham v. State, 91 N.W. 421 (Neb. 1902) (upholding a Nebraska law 
regulating and limiting the employment of women in certain industries); State v. Buchanan, 70 P. 52 
(Wash. 1902) (upholding a Washington state law prohibiting the employment of females in certain business 
establishments for more than 10 hours per day); Com. v. Beatty, 15 Pa. Super. Ct. 5 (1900) (upholding a 
Pennsylvania law criminalizing the employment of women in manufacturing establishments, mercantile 
industries, and certain other venues for more than 12 hours per day or 60 hours per week).   But see, 
Childrens Hosp. V. Adkins, 284 F. 613, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1922) (invalidating, as inconsistent with Lochner, a 
Washington, D.C., law setting minimum wages for women, but not for men.); Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 
454 (Ill. 1895) (invalidating an Illinois law limiting the working hours of women). 
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head of that unit.  Accordingly, married women were not permitted to enter into contracts 
or sue or be sued in court.90 
Other limitations on women’s freedom of contract might be more subtle, as when 
women, due to their “delicate” nature or a perceived need to protect them from their own 
bad bargains, are permitted to rescind their contracts based on protective doctrines such 
as, for example, fraud, duress, or unconscionability, when the same contract would have 
been enforced against a man.91  Accordingly, we hypothesized that these gendered 
notions might have found their way into the law of fraudulent silence, especially in older 
cases.  We thus predicted that a duty to disclose secret information is more likely to be 
found when the uninformed party is female than when the uninformed party is male.   
3. The uninformed party was sick, disabled, illiterate, or elderly, though 
competent to contract 
 
It has been argued that, in the law of fraudulent silence, as elsewhere, courts often 
rule in favor of sympathetic plaintiffs.92  Accordingly, courts might more readily impose 
disclosure duties when the uninformed party is competent to contract, but is sick, 
90 See generally, Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, And The Globe, 111 Yale 
L.J. 619, 636 (2001) (discussing the law of coverture); Reva B. Siegel, She The People: The Nineteenth 
Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, And The Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 982-83 (2002) (same).  In 
theory at least, restrictions on women’s rights to contract under the doctrine of coverture were abolished 
during the nineteenth century, with the widespread passage of married women’s property acts.  Siegel, 
supra this note at 983 (stating that “[i]t is often said that the married women's property acts abolished the 
common law of coverture in the nineteenth century--a legal fiction if ever there was one. Even the briefest 
look at antisuffrage discourse reveals that core concepts of coverture were a vibrant part of American legal 
culture well into the twentieth century and shaped public as well as private law”). 
91 See, e.g., Mary Jo Frug, Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 Am. U. 
L. Rev. 1065, 1085-86 (1985) (arguing that, in Jackson v. Seymour, the court allows Lucy Jackson to 
rescind a contract for the sale of land to her brother because of “gendered ideas” about the vulnerability and 
financial dependence of widows, rather than because of the confidential nature of their relationship); 
Debora L. Threedy , Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 1247, 1262 (1999) (stating that, 
“[m]any contract doctrines are paternalistic in the sense of protecting the ‘weaker’ or disadvantaged party: 
concealment, misrepresentation, unilateral mistake, undue influence, duress, unconscionability, minority, 
and lack of capacity all could be said to have a protectionist cast,” and noting further that, “[f]eminists have 
just begun to question whether paternalistic doctrines like unconscionability help or harm women”).  But 
see Margo Schlanger, Injured Women Before Common Law Courts, 1860-1930, 21 Harv. Women’s L.J. 79 
(1998) (finding that courts treated gender as an important aspect in assessing standards of care giving 
women fair treatment in torts). 
92 C.f. DeMott, supra note 2 at 97 (stating that, “[t]o an unusual degree, judicial opinions in [these] cases . . 
. personalize the parties.”); Strudler, supra note 3 at 340 (arguing that nondisclosure law should pay 
  
 32
                                                                                                                                                                            
disabled, illiterate, elderly, or extraordinarily mentally deficient in some way.  In other 
words, our goal was to identify contracting parties who even the most conservative courts 
might readily consider easy targets in need of protection from unscrupulous predators.  
Accordingly, we predicted that courts are significantly more likely to impose a duty to 
disclose when the uninformed party is sick, disabled, elderly, or illiterate. . 
E. Behavior of the Informed Party 
Just as the characteristics of the uninformed party might impact court rulings, the 
informed party’s behavior might influence court decisions regarding the need for 
disclosure in any given transaction.  Specifically, when the informed party has “behaved 
badly,” courts might be more likely to punish or discourage such behavior through the 
imposition of disclosure duties that deprive the informed party of the opportunity to 
legally profit from her secret information.  Accordingly, we examined two types of bad 
behavior by the informed party: affirmative misrepresentations or half-truths that 
accompany the undisclosed information, and active concealment of the undisclosed 
information. 
1. The informed party made affirmative misrepresentations or half-truths 
Often fraudulent silence claims form one part of a larger claim in which other 
wrongs are alleged, such as affirmative misrepresentations or half-truths.  Although 
technically courts should rule on each count of the complaint separately and a finding that 
the informed party intentionally misrepresented one fact should not impact the court’s 
finding on liability for a different, undisclosed fact,93 we believe that courts are often 
swayed by a general pattern of bad conduct on the part of the informed party.94  
 
attention to the moral drama that occurs in bargaining and to the sources of individual negotiators' 
grievances about exploitation, deception, and betrayal.”). 
93 Unless, of course, the informed party’s lies somehow prevented the uninformed party from learning the 
truth. 
94 Wilson , supra note 14 at 234 (stating that, “’[I]f a single word be dropped which tends to mislead the 
vendor’ it will vitiate the contract. Thus it is, that in the mass of cases in which concealment or fraudulent 
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Accordingly, we would expect to see disclosure required more often when the informed 
party also made affirmative misrepresentations or half-truths, than when the informed 
party was truly silent. 
A half-truth is a statement that, although technically accurate, is nonetheless 
misleading in some way.95  As stated in section 529 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
“[a] representation stating the truth so far as it goes but which the maker knows or 
believes to be materially misleading because of his failure to state additional or 
qualifying matter is a fraudulent misrepresentation.”96 
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that “[a] statement might 
be true with respect to the facts stated, but might fail to include qualifying matter 
necessary to prevent the implication of an assertion that is false with respect to other 
facts.”97  To illustrate, the Restatement notes that a true statement that an event has 
recently occurred might nonetheless mislead, if it creates the false impression that matters 
have not changed subsequently.98 
Donald Langevoort has correctly noted that there is no bright line between 
affirmative misrepresentations and half-truths, or between half-truths and 
nondisclosure.99  Instead, all three arise in transactional settings in which the parties 
typically trade large amounts of information and, thus, represent a continuum, making 
 
silence appears, there is also present this misrepresentation.”) (quoting Turner v. Harvey, 1 Jacob 178 
(1821)).   
95 See Langevoort, supra note 40 at 88-89 (discussing the half-truth); Goldfarb, supra note 87 at 24 (stating 
that, [w]hile silence alone may not be actionable, if the vendor undertakes to speak, he must not conceal 
anything which would tend to qualify or contradict the facts which he had stated.  In other words, to tell 
half of the truth is to make a half-false representation.”) 
96 Rest. 2d Torts §529.  The Restatement goes on to elaborate, “[t]hus, a statement that contains only 
favorable matters and omits all reference to unfavorable matters is as much a false representation as if all 
the facts stated were untrue.” Rest. 2d Torts §529, comment a.  Although half-truths are actionable under 
both tort and contract law, See Rest. 2d Torts §529, Rest. 2d Contracts §159, they form an especially 
important part of securities litigation.  See, Langevoort, supra note 40 at 90-91 (noting that half-truths are 
actionable under sections 17(a)(2), 11, and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, and under Rule 10b-5 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.) 
97 Rest. 2d Contracts §159, comment b. 
98 Rest. 2d Contracts §159, comment b. 
99 Langevoort, supra note 40 at 95-96. 
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coding at the margins sometimes difficult.100  We predicted that courts are more likely to 
impose a duty to disclose when the informed party lied or told a half-truth in the same 
transaction in which she failed to disclose material information, than when the informed 
party’s silence is unaccompanied by lies or half-truths. 
2. The informed party actively concealed information 
It frequently has been asserted that, if the informed party takes some affirmative 
steps to prevent detection of the truth by the uninformed party, then disclosure is more 
likely to be required.  As stated by one commentator: “Concealment involves some 
positive action on the part of one to prevent the other from ascertaining some material 
fact, which without the interference he would probably have discovered.”101   
For example, the seller of land might cover a landfill, ditch, or other defect on the 
property with dirt and then fail to disclose this information to prospective purchasers.102  
Similarly, if the uninformed party inquires about certain facts, the informed party might 
lead him (through words or actions) in a direction where the facts cannot be found.103  
We predicted that courts are more likely to require disclosure in such instances than in a 
case where the seller had merely remained silent about some information, but took no 
steps to prevent discovery by the purchaser. 
100 Id. at 96; Goldfarb, supra note 87 at 25 (noting that “a business transaction is never entirely without 
conversation, and verbal exchanges nearly always involve, expressly or by implication, representations of 
fact.”) 
101 Wilson, supra note 14 at 233. See also, Goldfarb, supra note 87 at 10 (distinguishing between “active 
concealment and mere nondisclosure”) 
102 See, Merchant’s Bank v. Campbell, 75 Va. 455 (1881) (fraud found where defendants stopped up the 
entrance to a valuable cavern and told plaintiffs that it was “nothing but a mud-hole.”); Schneider v. Heath, 
3 Campb. 506 (1813) (opinion of Lord Mansfield, finding fraud where defendants had removed a ship from 
the ways, where it had been sitting dry, and docked it in the water so that the plaintiffs could not observe 
defects on the bottom of the boat). 
103 See, e.g., Chrisholm v. Gadsden, 32 S.C.L. 220 (1847) (in response to uninformed party’s inquiries, 
informed party sent him to inspect area of property where he knew the defect could not be discovered.); 
Stewart v. Whyoming Ranch Co., 128 U.S. 383, 386 (1888) (fraud found where defendant prevented 
plaintiff’s agent from making inquiries which would have revealed material negative information). 
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F.   Case Date 
One of the goals of this study was to identify any historical patterns in the data.   
Specifically, the aim was to test the frequently repeated but never empirically tested 
hypothesis that the doctrine of caveat emptor had faded in importance over time and that, 
correspondingly, common law disclosure duties had increased during the time period of 
our study (approximately 1789 to May 15, 2002).104  It has been asserted, in particular, 
that the law governing latent defects became more pro-disclosure in recent years.105 
The most commonly asserted rationale for this perceived trend is an economic 
one: as America was transformed from an agrarian economy in which people typically 
transacted primarily with persons whom they knew to a commercial economy in which 
people regularly transacted with complete strangers, the law became more protective of 
the rights of uninformed parties, in order to encourage commerce.106  In other words, 
legal changes occurred in response to economic changes. 
We thus predicted that the more recently a case was decided, the more likely a 
court would be to find that the informed party owed the uninformed party a duty to 
disclose.  In addition, given Kronman’s claim regarding the trend over time for cases 
involving latent defects, we predicted that, for cases in which the withheld information 
104 See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 22 at 31 (stating that, “[I]t is of course apparent that the content of the 
maxim ‘caveat emptor’, used in its broader meaning of imposing risks on both parties to a transaction, has 
been greatly limited since its origin.”); Kronman, supra note 1 at 24; Saul Levmore, Securities & Secrets: 
Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 Va. L. Rev. 117, 133-34 (1982) (stating that, “[m]odern 
cases, however, can be read as signaling a trend toward increased disclosure requirements.”)  But see, 
Dalley, supra note 2 at 441 (finding that the law of deceit did not become more protective of the rights of 
uninformed parties from 1790-1860.); William B. Goldfarb, Fraud and Nondisclosure in the Vendor-
Purchaser Relation, 8 Western Res. L. Rev. 5, 9 (1956) (stating that, [w]riters who believe that [caveat 
emptor] has lost much of its content seem to be misreading the bulk of the decisions”). 
105 Kronman, supra note 1 at 24 (arguing that, in “the last twenty-five years,” disclosure duties regarding 
latent defects have increased dramatically). 
106 Horwitz, supra note 14 at 198-201 (arguing that, as markets and commerce became depersonalized, 
courts shifted their focus toward requiring disclosure of information not available to both parties, in 
contrast to the either strict caveat emptor or the fair price doctrine that had preceded it).  See also, J. Econ. 
History (1996) (stating that, “the doctrine of caveat emptor for sales replaced the sound price rule (which 
presumed that any item sold at full price was sound) by the early 1800’s and remained strong throughout 
the early 20th century.”) 
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related to a latent defect, courts would be more likely to find a duty to disclose during the 
period 1958 through 1983, as compared to the years before 1958. 
G.  Court 
1. Geographic Patterns 
 
We also wanted to determine whether any geographical patterns emerged in the 
cases.  In particular, we wanted to test the assertion by some legal and economic 
historians that southern states were historically much less likely to impose disclosure 
duties on bargaining parties than were states in other regions.107   
We predicted that courts in the south would be less likely to impose disclosure 
duties as compared to other regions during two early periods: 1793-1860 and 1861-
1940.108 In addition, we examined regional trends in a recent period: 1940-2002. 
2. Differences Between Federal and State Courts 
 
Although we are not aware of assertions by commentators of differences among 
the cases according to jurisdiction, we wanted to test for such differences.  In particular, 
we were interested in whether state courts impose disclosure duties more frequently than 
federal courts, and whether there are detectable differences among the federal circuits.  
Because commentators have not asserted that such differences exist, we predicted no 
significant influence of either the deciding court’s circuit or of whether the deciding court 
was state or federal on the probability that a court would find a duty to disclose. 
H. Summary of Hypotheses 
Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses discussed throughout this section. In addition, 
the table presents a summary of the basic results obtained from our regression analyses, 
the details of which appear infra in Section IV.  
107 See Dalley, supra note 2 at 431-32 (studying cases decided between 1790 and 1860 and claiming that 
cases in the South resulted in more pro-seller decisions than other regions). 
108 We chose these dates because they correspond roughly with the end of the Civil War and the beginning 
of World War II, two events that were highly significant for the south. 
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PREDICTED SIGN REGRESSION
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE OF COEFFICIENT RESULTS
Type of Information:
  Information was intrinsic + / NO EFFECT NO EFFECT
  Undisclosed information concerned personal intentions or opinions —  — / NO EFFECT
  Undisclosed information related to a latent defect + +
  Information concerned a defect likely to cause bodily injury + NO EFFECT
  Information concerned a defect likely to cause property damage + NO EFFECT
  Information would have updated or corrected previously disclosed information + +
Type of Transaction:
  Parties to transaction in a confidential or fiduciary relationship + +
  Transaction concerned acquisition of insurance + NO EFFECT
  Transaction concerned release from liability + NO EFFECT
  Parties had unequal access to information + +
  Transaction concerned the transfer of real property + + / NO EFFECT
  Transaction concerned the transfer of a slave + Perfect predictor**
Type of Acquisition:
  Information was casually acquired NO EFFECT + / NO EFFECT
  Information was acquired through illegal or tortious means + NO EFFECT
Uninformed Party Characteristics:
  Uninformed party was the buyer or lessee + +
  Uninformed party was female + NO EFFECT
  Uninformed party was sick, disabled, illiterate or elderly + +
Informed Party Characteristics:
  Informed party made affirmative misrepresentations + +
  Informed party concealed information + +
  Informed party told a half-truth + +
Time Trends:
  Year case was decided + —
Geographic Trends*:
  Decision made by state court NO EFFECT + / NO EFFECT
3rd Cir:  — / NO EFFECT          
6th Cir:  — 
7th Cir:  —
*   The predictions and results pertaining to the effects of the regional location of the court are provided in detail infra  in Section IV.
** This variable is dropped from all regressions because, in each of the three cases involving slaves, the court found a duty to disclose.
to disclose and results from basic regressions used to test these hypotheses. The results section also includes results of 
hypotheses that are not tested using basic regressions. Note that the table reports the results from all specifications. Indeterminate 
results indicate that the results are not robust to various specificiations.
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES AND BASIC REGRESSION RESULTS
TABLE 1: This table provides a summary of the hypotheses derived from the literature regarding the factors influencing courts to find a duty   
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG ODDS OF COURT FINDING A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
  Decision made by federal circuit court NO EFFECT
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III. DATA COLLECTION 
A. The Collection Process 
We ran our search on May 15, 2002, and retrieved cases in the “Allcases-old” and 
“Allcases” databases on Westlaw.109  The search retrieved 217 cases in the Allcases-old 
database, resulting in 152 observations.110  The search retrieved 1086 cases in the 
Allcases database, from which a random sample resulting in 314 observations was drawn, 
for a combined total of 466 observations.  Courts found a duty to disclose in 51% of the 
cases in our sample.111 
1. The Search Terms 
The search terms that we employed are: duty /3 disclos! /p fraud /p (contract tort) % 
securities /3 act.  The search was purposely designed to exclude cases that were decided 
under the federal securities laws and, as a result, also excluded cases that might have 
referenced the securities laws in reaching a decision.  As a result, only one case involving 
fraudulent silence in connection with the purchase or sale of a security was present in our 
dataset.   
2.Case Coding 
Case coding was done by research assistants, with the supervision of one of the 
authors.112  Steps were taken to enhance the consistency of coding by the different 
research assistants.  These steps include the adoption of bright-line rules, where 
109  See the immediately following section for more detail regarding how the search for cases was 
conducted. 
110 Some cases are not usable, either because the court failed to reach a decision on the merits with respect 
to the element of duty, because the search terms identified a case that does not actually address the question 
being studied, or because the court’s decision did not reflect the common law because it was based on a 
statute or was impacted by a warranty or waiver.  As a result, the number of observations is less than the 
number of cases retrieved.  See infra notes 114-116 and accompanying text (further explaining this). 
111 Although this statistic is consistent with the predictions of the Priest-Klein model, for reasons discussed 
infra notes 179-184 and accompanying text, we believe this statistic is anomalous and unrelated to the 
Priest-Klein model. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
of Legal Studies 1, 6 (1984). 
112 Weekly meetings were held as a group in order to assess progress, discuss the cases, and answer 
questions. 
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possible,113 and several weeks of individually coding the same set of cases and discussing 
them as a group.  Once the group was able to consistently reach the same coding results, 
coding on the project began.  In addition, once the initial case coding was complete, all of 
the coding was double-checked by a research assistant who had not been involved in the 
initial coding project.  
As previously noted, not all cases retrieved by the search terms were includable in the 
study.114  For example, a small percentage of cases contained all of the specified search 
terms, yet did not address the question being studied.  In addition, we were unable to 
code some cases, either because the court did not reach a decision on the merits of the 
case, or because the opinion did not contain sufficient information to allow for complete 
coding of all the independent variables.115  Finally, cases in which the common law had 
been altered due to a waiver, warranty, or statute were excluded.116 
Cases decided under a statute were especially problematic.  Many states have 
attempted to codify or expand the law governing fraudulent nondisclosure in particular 
areas, especially real estate sales, consumer financing transactions, car sales, and health 
care delivery.  As a result, some cases in these areas (especially more recent cases) might 
be decided under a statute.  We did not automatically exclude such cases from our 
dataset.  Instead, when the statute (or, where relevant, the legislative history) simply 
prohibited “fraud” without defining it (thus forcing courts to return to the common law 
for a definition) or merely codified the common law, we coded the case as if it had been 
113 These rules are discussed in connection with the individual variables in Part II of this Article. 
114 See supra note 110 (discussing the difference between the number of cases retrieved and the number of 
usable cases). 
115 When the case included in our sample was an appeal from a lower court decision and that lower decision 
was available on Westlaw, the research assistants sometimes referred to the lower court decision to attain 
the complete facts necessary to code the case.  In rare cases where a court did not reach a decision on the 
merits of the case, the court nonetheless clearly indicated how it would have ruled if forced to decide the 
case.  Such cases were included in our dataset, despite the lack of a formal resolution to the dispute. 
116 For example, a waiver might alter the common law by waiving the uninformed party’s rights to sue for 
nondisclosure under common law. This would include items sold “as is.” Similarly, a warranty might 
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decided under the common law.  However, where the statute attempted to change or 
expand the common law, or where the statute specifically imposed liability for a failure 
to disclose (as is typical, for example, in some statutes governing real estate sales), the 
case was excluded.117 
Finally, the research assistants checked all the cases in our dataset for negative direct 
history.  If a lower court fraudulent silence decision was reversed and remanded 
specifically on the element of the existence of a duty to disclose, then the lower court 
case was excluded from our dataset. The appellate decision also was excluded unless the 
appellate court reached a decision on the merits of the duty element. If, however, a lower 
court case was overturned for procedural reasons or on a point of law unrelated to the 
duty to disclose issue, then the lower court case was included in our dataset, despite the 
fact that the holding technically no longer stands. 
B. The Available Cases 
The Allcases-old database includes documents from the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, the U.S. District Courts, the former Circuit Courts, the former Court 
of Claims, “related federal courts” (such as the tax and customs courts), and state and 
local courts.118  The federal documents included in the database are those opinions 
“released for publication” between 1789 and 1944.119  State and local coverage begins on 
various dates and extends through 1944.120    
 
enhance the uninformed party’s status under the common law, by guaranteeing the value or suitability of 
the item in question. 
117 A surprisingly large number of such cases, especially cases concerning real estate sales, remain in our 
dataset, however.  This is because many state statutes imposing liability for a failure to disclose also permit 
an informed waiver of the statute’s protection.  In many of the real estate cases in our dataset, such a waiver 
was procured, leaving the parties to rely on common law remedies. 
118 See, Westlaw, Allcases-Old, Scope, p. 1. 
119 Id.  It is unclear from West’s website whether “released for publication” refers only to documents 
officially released for publication or whether it also includes unpublished opinions that might have become 
available.  Neither West’s reference attorneys nor any other company representative was able to clarify this 
point.  Phone interview with West reference attorney, August 4, 2002.  Because the practice (at least within 
the federal appellate courts) of disposing of cases through unpublished opinions is assumed by most 
commentators to have begun in 1964, however, the issue of unpublished opinions is likely to be a greater 
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The Allcases database includes decisions dated after 1944 from the United States 
Supreme Court, the United States Courts of Appeals, the United States District Courts, 
the Bankruptcy Courts, the Court of Federal Claims, the U.S. Tax Court, U.S. Military 
Courts, and the state and local courts of all the states and the District of Columbia.121  
The Allcases database includes published as well as unpublished opinions.122 
Like many other studies attempting to empirically examine case law or judicial 
developments, this study is limited to the Westlaw database, which does not include all 
decided cases.123  Instead, Westlaw excludes some unpublished cases, thus biasing the 
results to the extent that there is some systematic difference between available and 
unavailable cases.124   For example, because the unpublished federal appellate decisions 
seem more likely to be included on Lexis and Westlaw than are unpublished state court 
decisions, if there is some systematic difference between federal appellate court decisions 
 
problem in the Allcases database than in the Allcases-old database.  See, infra note 128 and accompanying 
text (discussing the origination of the federal appellate non-publication and no-citation policies.) 
120 Westlaw, Allcases-Old, Scope, at 2-4. 
121 See, Westlaw, Allcases Scope, p. 1. 
122 Id. at 1.  An “unpublished” opinion is one which the court has determined should be excluded from the 
official reporter, ostensibly because the case contains no precedential value.  Cf. Melissa M. Serfass & 
Jessie L. Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions, J. of 
Appellate Practice and Process 251 (2001) (outlining the guidelines for opinion publication and citation in 
each federal and state court of appeal).  
123 A study seeking to examine the case law of a particular jurisdiction for a short (and relatively modern) 
timeframe could examine all decided cases in some courts by attaining unpublished opinions either through 
Westlaw or Lexis, the individual court’s website, the court clerk, or some other collection service.  This 
step is impractical in a study, such as ours, that attempts to analyze a sample of the entire set of federal and 
state cases. Furthermore, as discussed infra notes 129-134 and accompanying text, early American cases 
were often unreported, making any historical study of the common law incomplete. 
124 According to a Westlaw representative, West gathers unpublished opinions for inclusion in the Allcases 
database from three sources: (1) the Federal Appendix, a West publication; (2) opinions submitted to 
Westlaw for posting in the database directly by the deciding court; and (3) opinions submitted to Westlaw 
by attorneys.  Phone interview with West reference attorney, Aug. 4, 2002.    
 The federal appendix does not contain all unpublished opinions.  For example, the Third, Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits do not permit publication of their unpublished opinions in the Appendix.  Brian P. 
Brooks, Publishing Unpublished Opinions, 5 Greenbag 259, 260 (2002).  In addition, the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits do not release their unpublished opinions for inclusion in the Westlaw or Lexis databases.  
See, David Greenwald & Frederick A. O. Schwartz, The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1133, 
1174 n. 64 (2002). 
 Finally, West does not include in the Allcases database all unpublished opinions submitted for 
inclusion by attorneys.  Instead, West reviews the submitted cases and selects “some” for inclusion.  No 
Westlaw representative was able to provide further information on the selection process, what criteria were 
used to determine inclusion, or indicate what percentage of cases submitted for inclusion by attorneys was 
ultimately included in the database.  Interview with West reference attorney, Aug. 4, 2002. 
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and state court decisions, this differential inclusion in the Westlaw database could affect 
the results of this or any other study relying on the Westlaw database. Similarly, because 
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits do not release their unpublished opinions for inclusion on 
Westlaw or Lexis, if there is some systematic difference between the Fifth and Eleventh 
circuits on the one hand, and the other eleven circuits on the other hand, this difference 
might bias the results of this and any other study that employs the Westlaw database.  
Given that, in the federal appeals courts alone, over 80% of the caseload is disposed 
of through unpublished opinions, this is a potentially glaring omission.125  As a matter of 
black letter law, federal unpublished opinions have no precedential value.126 However, 
many commentators have disputed the notion that unpublished opinions are really of no 
consequence.127 Accordingly, readers should at least be aware of the potential limits of 
this or any other study based on the on-line databases. 
Although the problem of officially unpublished cases does not likely affect the 
Allcases-old database – the practice is generally assumed to have begun with the 1964 
Federal Judicial Conference128 – surveys of older American case law suffer from an even 
greater problem:  the lack of case reporting during the early years of American 
independence.  In the early years of the history of the American courts, lack of reporting 
of decided cases was a serious problem.129  Lawyers had to make do with reports of 
125 See, Table S-3, U.S. Courts of Appeals – Types of Orders Filed in Cases Terminated on the Merits after 
Oral Hearings or Submission on Briefs During the 12-month period Ending September 30, 2001.  
Available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2001/tables/s03sep01.pdf.    
126 cite 
127 See, Suzanne O. Snowden, "That’s My Holding and I’m Not Sticking to It!” Court Rules That Deprive 
Unpublished Opinions of Precedential Authority Distort the Common Law, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 1253 
(2001) (arguing that unpublished opinions often would have had important future precedential value if 
they had been published).   
128 See, e.g., Greenwald & Schwartz, supra note 124 at 1141; Deborah J. Merritt & James J. Brudney, 
Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 
71, 75-76 (2001). 
129 See Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on the Marshall 
Court Ascendancy, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1291 (1985) (discussing the problem of nonreporting of cases in the 
early years of the American court system).  See also, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) iii-v (1804) (stating that, “[m]uch 
of that uncertainty of the law, which is so frequently, and perhaps so justly, the subject of complaint in this 
country, may be attributed to the want of American reports.”) (quoted in Joyce, supra this note at 1308). 
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English cases, which were still widely used even after American independence, and 
notebooks of decisions that lawyers maintained for their own use and the use of their 
colleagues and friends.130   
Even opinions of the United States Supreme Court were difficult to come by in the 
early years.  The Court often failed to reduce even its most important decisions to 
writing;131 the reporters did not include all decisions in their reports, perhaps excluding, 
in some cases, as many as half;132 reports were often unavailable for periods of up to 
eight years after the end of the Supreme Court term;133 and the reports of some reporters, 
at least, were heavily criticized, even by their contemporaries and the justices themselves, 
as being inaccurate.134  One can only assume that reports of state and lower federal cases 
suffered from similar problems. 
Readers should thus bear in mind that our only historical record of early court 
decisions might be substantially inaccurate.  Again, this is an unavoidable failing of all 
studies of early case law, and we do not feel that it renders our results any less important 
or robust. 
Finally, as with all analyses of decided cases, this study does not account for the 
impact of settlement on the type of case that ultimately proceeds to the litigation stage or 
130 Joyce, supra note 129 at 1295, See also, Surrency, Law Reports in the United States, 25 Am J. Legal 
Hist. 48, 49 (1981) (discussing the prevalence of English law reports in 18th century estates).  [cite] 
131 Joyce, supra note 129 at 1391, n. 46 and at n. 77 (quoting from a telephone conversation with Maeva 
Marcus, Coeditor, Documentary History Project as stating that “[I]t seems odd that if opinions were written 
not a single one in the hand of a justice survives. So it is likely that few, if any, ever existed.”)   
132 Id. at 1303 (discussing the incompleteness of the reports of Alexander James Dallas, the Court’s first – 
though unofficial – reporter) and at 1329-1330 (discussing the omission of cases by Henry Wheaton, the 
Court’s third – and first official – reporter). 
133 Id. at 1327-28 (noting that Cranch and Dallas had allowed Supreme Court cases to go unreported for 8 
and 6 years, respectively).  These delays were corrected by Wheaton, who generally published the reports 
of the prior term in time for the start of the next.  Id. at 1327-28. 
134 Id. at 1304-1305 (discussing the inaccuracy of Dallas’s reports); 1309-10 (discussing inaccuracies in the 
reports of Williams Cranch, the Court’s second – though unofficial – reporter); and at 1361 (discussing 
criticisms of the reports of Richard Peters, Jr., the Court’s fourth reporter).  The problem of inaccuracy 
probably stemmed from many causes, including commercial considerations and the fact that some reporters 
(notably, Dallas) included reports of cases that they did not have first hand knowledge of, but instead 
reconstructed from notes of attorneys in attendance.  Id. at 1305.  One exception to these criticisms of 
inaccuracy appears to be Wheaton, who apparently was “fanatical” on this point.  Id. at 1329-30. 
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the impact of judicial statements of case facts on our assumptions regarding what 
occurred in any given transaction.  As argued by some commentators, judges may 
selectively repeat only the information that they consider relevant, or may allow their 
own biases to shape their interpretation and description of the facts of the case.135  As 
noted, however, this is typical of all legal analyses based on decided cases, including 
traditional doctrinal legal scholarship. 
C. Summary Statistics 
Table 2 provides a short description of the variables related to case characteristics 
and summary statistics for the entire sample, for the sub-sample of cases requiring 
disclosure, and for the sub-sample of cases not requiring disclosure. Table 3 provides the 
same information for variables related to decision date, geographic region, and 
jurisdiction. 
135 See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, The Ultimate Injustice: When a Court Misstates the Facts  11 Cardozo  L. 
Rev. 1313, 1325-31 (1990) (arguing that Judge Easterbrook misstates the facts of the case in Branion v. 
Gramly); Robert P. Burns, The Lawfulness of the American Trial, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 205, 219 (2001) 
(stating that “lawyers . . . often believe that the account of the facts provided by appellate courts is deeply 
unfair”). 
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VARIABLE DEFINITION
Dependent Variable:
  DISCL 0.51 (238) 1 = court imposed liability for fraudulent silence
Independent Variables:
  Type of Information:
  INSTRINSIC 0.97 (452) 0.97 (230) 0.97 (222) 1 = information related to subject matter of transaction
  PERSONAL 0.09 (42) 0.05 (12) 0.13 (30) 1 = undisclosed information concerned personal intentions or opinions
  LATENT 0.13 (60) 0.20 (48) 0.05 (12) 1 = undisclosed information related to a latent defect
  INJURE 0.03 (12) 0.03 (8) 0.02 (4) 1 = information concerned a defect likely to cause bodily injury
  DAMAGE 0.08 (36) 0.10 (23) 0.06 (13) 1 = information concerned a defect likely to cause property damage
  UP_CORR 0.13 (62) 0.17 (41) 0.09 (21) 1 = information would have updated or corrected previously disclosed information
  Type of Transaction:
  CONFID 0.28 (131) 0.43 (102) 0.13 (29) 1 = parties to transaction in a confidential or fiduciary relationship
  INSURE 0.07 (32) 0.08 (20) 0.05 (12) 1 = transaction concerned acquisition of insurance
  RELEASE 0.03 (15) 0.04 (9) 0.03 (6) 1 = transaction concerned release from liability
  ACCESS 0.58 (268) 0.70 (165) 0.45 (103) 1 = parties had unequal access to information
  PROPERTY 0.34 (157) 0.41 (96) 0.27 (61) 1 = transaction concerned the transfer of real property
  SLAVE 0.01 (3) 0.01 (3) 0.00 (0) 1 = transaction concerned the transfer of a slave
  Type of Acquisition:
  CASUAL 0.80 (371) 0.80 (190) 0.79 (181) 1 = information was casually acquired
  ILLEGAL 0.01 (4) 0.01 (3) 0.004 (1) 1 = information was acquired through illegal or tortious means
  Uninformed Party Characteristics:
  BUYER 0.40 (186) 0.46 (109) 0.34 (77) 1 = uninformed party was the buyer or lessee
  FEMALE 0.12 (55) 0.14 (33) 0.10 (22) 1 = uninformed party was female
  SICK 0.06 (27) 0.08 (19) 0.03 (8) 1 = uninformed party was sick, disabled, illiterate or elderly
  Informed Party Characteristics:
  LIED 0.20 (91) 0.35 (83) 0.03 (8) 1 = informed party made affirmative misrepresentations
  CONCEAL 0.08 (36) 0.14 (33) 0.01 (3) 1 = informed party concealed information
  HALF_TRUTH 0.23 (106) 0.37 (87) 0.08 (19) 1 = informed party told a half-truth
SAMPLE DUTY DUTY
TABLE 2: This table provides a summary of the variables representing case characterstics employed in the empirical analysis along with the mean and description of each variable. The entire sample 
consists of 466 cases. The mean for each variable for the full sample can be interpreted as the percentage of cases characterized by the variable. For example, a mean of 51% for DISCLOSURE indicates 
that 51% of the cases held the informed party liable. The numbers in the parentheses indicate the number of cases (i.e., mean times total number of cases in the sample).
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
TABLE 2
CASE CHARACTERISTICS
MEAN
FOR FULL
(N = 466)
MEAN
FOR CASES
FINDING
DISCLOSURE
 (N = 237)
MEAN FOR
CASES
FINDING NO
DISCLOSURE
 (N = 229)
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VARIABLE DEFINITION
Additional Independent Variables:
  YEAR 1961 1949 1973 year case was decided (range = [1793 , 2002])
  STATE 0.75 (348) 0.83 (197) 0.66 (151) 1 = case was decided by a state court
  FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS
    CIR1 0.02 (8) 0.01 (3) 0.02 (5) 1 = case was decided by the first circuit
    CIR2 0.05 (21) 0.02 (4) 0.07 (17) 1 = case was decided by the second circuit
    CIR3 0.02 (10) 0.01 (2) 0.03 (8) 1 = case was decided by the third circuit
    CIR4 0.02 (7) 0.02 (4) 0.01 (3) 1 = case was decided by the fourth circuit
    CIR5 0.02 (7) 0.01 (2) 0.02 (5) 1 = case was decided by the fifth circuit
    CIR6 0.02 (7) 0.004 (1) 0.03 (6) 1 = case was decided by the sixth circuit
    CIR7 0.02 (7) 0.01 (2) 0.02 (5) 1 = case was decided by the seventh circuit
    CIR8 0.03 (12) 0.02 (5) 0.03 (7) 1 = case was decided by the eighth circuit
    CIR9 0.03 (14) 0.03 (8) 0.03 (6) 1 = case was decided by the ninth circuit
    CIR10 0.02 (10) 0.02 (4) 0.03 (6) 1 = case was decided by the tenth circuit
    CIR11 0.01 (6) 0.00 (0) 0.03 (6) 1 = case was decided by the eleventh circuit
    FEDCIR 0.002 (1) 0.004 (1) 0.000 (0) 1 = case was decided by the federal circuit
    DCCIR 0.01 (3) 0.01 (2) 0.004 (1) 1 = case was decided by the D.C. circuit
  GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS
    WEST 0.14 (66) 0.16 (38) 0.12 (28) 1 = case was decided by a court located in the west
    SOUTH 0.25 (117) 0.23 (55) 0.27 (61) 1 = case was decided by a court located in the south
    MIDATLANTIC 0.23 (106) 0.24 (58) 0.21 (48) 1 = case was decided by a court located in a midatlantic state
    SOUTHWEST 0.08 (36) 0.08 (18) 0.08 (18) 1 = case was decided by a court located in the southwest
    NEWENGLAND 0.07 (32) 0.06 (15) 0.07 (17) 1 = case was decided by a court located in New England
    MIDWEST 0.24 (110) 0.22 (53) 0.25 (57) 1 = case was decided by a court located in the midwest
and description of each variable. The entire sample consists of 466 cases. The numbers in the parentheses indicate the number of cases (i.e., mean times total number of 
cases in the sample).
SAMPLE DUTY DUTY
TABLE 3
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
TABLE 3: This table provides a summary of the variables representing case date, geographic region and jurisdiction employed in the empirical analysis along with the mean 
CASE DATE, GEOGRAPHIC REGION AND JURISDCTION
MEAN
FOR FULL
(N = 466)
MEAN
FOR CASES
FINDING
DISCLOSURE
 (N = 237)
MEAN FOR
CASES
FINDING NO
DISCLOSURE
 (N = 229)
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IV. RESULTS 
The claims presented supra in Section II predict that the probability that a court 
will find a duty to disclose depends, in part, on five groups of factors: the type of 
information withheld by the informed party, the type of transaction in which the parties 
engaged, the way in which the information was acquired by the informed party, the 
characteristics of the uninformed party, and the behavior of the informed party. In 
addition to these factors, we also investigate trends related to the decision date, 
geographic location of the court, and jurisdiction. 
Our dependent variable—DISCLOSURE—is dichotomous; therefore, linear 
regression models such as Ordinary Least Squares (“OLS”) are not appropriate to 
perform estimations.136 Instead, we employ logistic regressions to estimate the effects of 
our independent variables on the predicted log odds that a court will require disclosure.137 
Using regression analysis to measure the effects of the independent variables on the 
predicted log odds that a court will require disclosure allows us to draw inferences about 
which factors significantly influence court decisions when other factors are taken into 
account. 
136 A dichotomous variable is one that can take on only one of two possible values. The variable 
DISCLOSURE is coded either as a “0” or a “1” for each observation in our sample. 
137 The dependent variable is the predicted log odds that the event will occur rather than probability that the 
event will occur because the log odds form satisfies the assumptions required to obtain valid regression 
results. The coefficients generated when using this form as the dependent variable lack an intuitively 
meaningful scale of interpretation. When interpreting the results in the text that follows, we interpret a 
coefficient that is statistically significant and positive as indicating that the presence of the associated 
independent variable leads to an increase in the likelihood that the court will require disclosure. 
 See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise and Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the 
Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 NYU L. Rev. 1377, 1431-32 n. 230 (1998) 
(explaining the technical differences between OLS models and logit models). For an introduction to logistic 
regression methodology, see generally Fred C. Pampel, Logistic Regression: A Primer (2000).  
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Throughout this section, it is important to note that all reported results are 
aggregate results and therefore do not reflect differences across jurisdictions.  In other 
words, a reported result that a particular variable (for example, PROPERTY) is 
insignificant could mean that the variable is truly an insignificant predictor of case 
outcomes in all jurisdictions.  At the same time, it is possible that the variable’s effect on 
decisions is significant and positive in the 1st circuit, canceling out the fact that it is 
significant and negative in the 2nd Circuit.  Similarly, a reported result that a particular 
variable (for example, ACCESS) is positive and significant could mean that the variable 
is a significant predictor of case outcomes in all jurisdictions or only a few. Indeed, it is 
possible that the variable’s effect is negative and slightly significant in only one or a few 
jurisdictions, but is counteracted by the variable’s highly significant positive impact in 
other jurisdictions. In other words, this project is designed to study overall general trends 
in decisions that correspond to claims made by legal scholars and economic historians 
regarding general trends and patterns in the law governing fraudulent nondisclosure.  We 
do not attempt to describe the law for any particular jurisdiction.  
Table 4 presents basic results for several logistic regression analyses that test the 
influence of various sets of independent variables on the likelihood that a court will find 
that the informed party owed a duty of disclosure to the uninformed party. 138 Various 
specifications were analyzed to test the robustness of the results given the large number 
of independent variables included in the model.139  The following sections provide a  
 
138 We also analyzed the data using probit analysis and obtained results that were nearly identical to the 
results we obtained using logistic regression analysis. For an explanation of how probit analysis differs 
from logistic regression analysis, see Pampel, supra note 137 at 54-68. 
139 By “specification” we mean the construction of the empirical equation that we estimate to generate 
results regarding how the independent variables affect the dependent variable. The process of specifying 
the model includes determining (1) which variables should be included in the model, (2) the functional 
form of the model and (3) the probabilistic assumptions made about the dependent variable, the 
independent variables and the error term.  A result is “robust” if it does not vary significantly with the 
specification of the model. 
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VARIABLE
Type of Information:
  INTRINSIC 0.32 0.16
(0.57) (0.86)
  PERSONAL - 0.93** - 0.32
(0.01) (0.56)
  LATENT 1.77*** 2.24***
(0.00) (0.00)
  INJURE 0.07 1.05
(0.92) (0.20)
  DAMAGE - 0.63 - 0.23
(0.18) (0.72)
  UP_CORR 0.90*** 1.06**
(0.00) (0.01)
Type of Transaction:
  CONFID 1.82*** 2.65***
(0.00) (0.00)
  INSURE 0.14 - 0.13
(0.77) (0.84)
  RELEASE 0.53 0.51
(0.39) (0.55)
  ACCESS 1.19*** 1.03***
(0.00) (0.00)
  PROPERTY 1.27*** 0.29
(0.00) (0.45)
Type of Acquisition:
  CASUAL 0.09 0.76*
(0.71) (0.06)
  ILLEGAL 1.10 1.26
(0.34) (0.46)
Uninformed Party Characteristics:
  BUYER 0.54** 1.18***
(0.01) (0.00)
  FEMALE 0.28 0.04
(0.36) (0.93)
  SICK 0.85* 1.58**
(0.06) (0.03)
Informed Party Characteristics:
  LIED 2.93*** 3.17***
(0.00) (0.00)
  CONCEAL 2.82*** 3.15***
(0.00) (0.00)
  HALF_TRUTH 2.18*** 2.81***
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.47 -1.60*** -0.04 -0.26** -1.01*** -4.41***
(0.40) (0.00) (0.84) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
LR Χ2 42.22 109.37 1.12 13.50 178.01 310.58
(0.00) (0.00) (0.57) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.28 0.48
N 466 463 466 466 466 463
these characteristics into account.
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
TABLE 4
Note: LR Χ2 indicates the result from testing the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the model, except     
COEFFICIENT
(P VALUE)
TABLE 4: This table provides the maximum-likelihood logit estimation results for the effects of case       
characteristics on whether the court found a duty to disclose. These results do not include the
effects of the decision date or the geographic location and jurisdiction of the court. See Table 6 for results taking
the constant, equal zero. In addition, it should be noted that, although pseudo R2 statistics provide a quick way
to compare the fit of different models for the same dependent variable, they lack the straightforward 
explained-variance interpretation of true R2 in OLS regressions.
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PREDICTED LOG ODDS OF COURT FINDING A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
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variable-by-variable analysis of the results derived from the regression analysis and 
various statistical tests. 
A. The Type of Information 
Recall that commentators have suggested that particular characteristics of the 
withheld information influence courts’ decisions in fraudulent silence cases. These 
characteristics include whether the information was intrinsic or extrinsic in nature, related 
to personal intentions or opinions versus facts, related to latent or patent defects, 
concerned a defect likely to cause bodily injury or property damage, and would have 
updated or corrected previously disclosed information. 
 
1. Whether the information was intrinsic, as opposed to extrinsic or market, 
information does not explain the variation in outcomes because 97% of the cases in the 
sample involve intrinsic information. 
 
a.  General Results 
We hypothesized that cases involving intrinsic information are more likely to 
result in a finding that the informed party owed a disclosure duty to the uniformed party 
in early years, but that the importance of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction disappears over 
time.140 As the results displayed in Table 4 indicate, the coefficient on INTRINSIC is 
insignificant (p > 0.10), indicating that the intrinsic nature of the information is not a 
factor that helps to explain the variation in case outcomes.141  It should be noted, 
however, that this result is driven by the fact that 97% of the cases in the full sample 
involve intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, information.  
Nonetheless, other statistical tests allow us to cast some doubt on the conventional 
wisdom regarding the relative likelihood that courts will require the disclosure of intrinsic 
information.  Specifically, tests for the equality of proportions cast doubt on claims that 
                                                          
140 See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (discussing assertions by courts and commentators 
regarding extrinsic information).   
141 In other words, the coefficient on INTRINSIC is not statistically significantly different from zero. 
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courts are more likely to require the disclosure of intrinsic information than extrinsic 
information.  Of the 14 cases in our data set involving extrinsic information, the court 
found the existence of a duty to disclose in 8 of the cases (or 43%). On the other hand, 
51% of the cases (or 231 of 452) involving intrinsic information resulted in a finding that 
the informed party owed the uninformed party a duty to disclose.  Our analysis thus 
reveals that courts are not statistically more likely to require the disclosure of intrinsic 
information as opposed to extrinsic information (p = 0.28). 
Moreover, an interesting question here is why so few cases involving extrinsic 
information result in judicial decisions. Apparently, cases involving extrinsic information 
are more likely to settle, or are less likely to be brought by plaintiffs.   
The first possibility is that cases involving extrinsic information are more likely to 
settle. This might be true if, for example, courts are much more likely to rule in favor of 
uninformed parties when the case involves extrinsic information. Informed parties, 
knowing they have a low probability of winning in court, are encouraged to settle. We 
find this theory unpersuasive, however, for two reasons.  First, the notion that informed 
parties have a lower probability of winning in court when the withheld information is 
extrinsic in nature is contrary to conventional wisdom, which asserts that courts are less 
likely to require the disclosure of extrinsic information than of intrinsic information. In 
addition, this theory is contrary to the results in those extrinsic information cases that do 
make it into court.  As discussed supra, informed parties are no more likely to prevail in 
cases involving extrinsic information than in cases involving intrinsic information. 
Informed parties thus have no reason to fear outcomes in cases involving extrinsic 
information more than in other types of fraudulent silence cases.    
A second, and we believe more plausible, explanation for why so few extrinsic 
information cases are found in our dataset is that plaintiffs are less likely to bring claims 
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for fraudulent silence when the withheld information is extrinsic, rather than intrinsic. 
There are at least three possible reasons for this phenomenon. First, it is possible that 
individuals are less likely to possess extrinsic information unknown to their bargaining 
partners as compared to intrinsic information. Second, if the common law clearly states 
that informed parties are not required to disclose extrinsic information, rational plaintiffs 
may choose to forgo litigating such cases. Again, however, the (limited) data do not 
support this conjecture. Courts found a duty to disclose in about 43% of the cases in our 
dataset involving extrinsic information.  The third, and perhaps most plausible, 
explanation for the small number of cases involving extrinsic information is that the 
uninformed party is unlikely to discover that the informed party knew of extrinsic 
information. For example, it is unlikely that a home buyer would discover that the seller 
had access to nonpublic information regarding the fact that a highway was going to be 
built across an adjacent lot.  By contrast, the uninformed party may be able to easily 
surmise that someone selling a car that she has owned for many years was aware that the 
engine fails to start in cold weather. 
b.  Interaction Effects 
Recall from Section II supra that commentators have asserted that some other 
factor, rather than the intrinsic nature of the information, actually explains the variation in 
fraudulent silence cases.  For example, W. Page Keeton has argued that, although courts 
require the disclosure of intrinsic information more frequently than extrinsic information, 
it is really the lack of equal access to intrinsic information relative to extrinsic 
information that is driving case outcomes.142   Similarly, Keeton argued that the 
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction fails to explain case outcomes when the uninformed party is 
the purchaser, as opposed to the seller.  Finally, Anthony Kronman has asserted that it is 
                                                          
142 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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really the fact that extrinsic information is typically deliberately acquired that drives case 
outcomes, rather than the mere fact that the information is extrinsic. 
To test these claims, we ran three separate regressions to determine if interaction 
effects are present between INTRINSIC and the three variables ACCESS, CASUAL, and 
BUYER.143  The results suggest that there are no significant interaction effects between 
INTRINSIC and these three variables.  This result, however, is most likely due to the lack 
of variation in the INTRINSIC variable and the resulting collinearity144 between the 
interaction term and the variables ACCESS, CASUAL, and BUYER.145 
c. Time Trends 
Recall that some commentators claim that courts, over time, put less weight on 
whether the information was intrinsic or extrinsic, and instead focus on other factors.146 
To test claims about the influence of intrinsic information over time, we tabulated the 
number of cases that involved intrinsic information and in which the court found a duty 
to disclose during three periods: 1793-1899, 1900-1949 and 1950-2002.147 Table 5 
presents the results from this tabulation. 
 
                                                          
143 By including interaction effects in the analysis, we are able to measure the amount of change in the 
slope of the regression of the dependent variable, say Y, on an independent variable, say X,  when a second 
independent variable, say Z, changes by one unit. A positive and significant coefficient on an interaction 
term, X * Z, implies that the higher is X, the greater the effect of Z on Y. Similarly, the higher is Z, the 
greater the effect of X on Y. 
144 Two variables are collinear if they are highly correlated. When two independent variables are highly 
correlated, they both introduce essentially the same information into the regression. This violates one of the 
necessary assumptions of the logit model. In addition, collinearity in this case implies that the interaction 
term has very little variation and, therefore, is not likely to be a significant factor in explaining the variation 
in outcomes.  
145 We ran these regressions using only the 20 variables relating to case characteristics.  We did not run the 
complete specification due to the insignificant results from the initial regression. 
146 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
147 These periods were chosen arbitrarily. The results do not vary if different periods are used to test the 
hypothesis.. 
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PERIOD
COURT FOUND 
DUTY TO 
DISCLOSE
COURT FOUND 
NO DUTY TO 
DISCLOSE
1793-1899 33 (77%) 10 (23%)
1900-1949 72 (70%) 31 (30%)
1950-2002 126 (41%) 180 (59%)
TABLE 5
TABULATIONS FOR CASES INVOLVING 
INTRINSIC INFORMATION
TABLE 5: This table presents the results of tabulations of the 
number of cases involving intrinsic information by outcome 
for three periods: 1793-1899, 1900-1949 and 1950-2002.  
 
Tests for the equality of proportions were performed to investigate the claim that 
over time courts place less emphasis on whether the information was intrinsic or 
extrinsic.148 First, we tested whether courts impose disclosure duties in a statistically 
significantly lower proportion of cases involving intrinsic information during the period 
1793-1899 than in the period 1900-1949. The result indicates that no statistically 
significant difference exists between the percentages (p = 0.20).149 On the other hand, the 
proportion of cases involving intrinsic information in which the court found a duty to 
disclose during the period 1900-1949 was statistically significantly higher than the 
proportion of such cases during the period 1950-2002 (p = 0.00). Therefore, the data do 
show some support for the claim that factors other than whether the information was 
intrinsic or extrinsic became more important to courts over time.  This alone, however, 
                                                          
148 In particular, we ran two-sample, one-sided tests on the equality of proportions (calculated using the 
data from two distinct samples). These tests pit the null hypothesis of equal proportions against an 
alternative hypothesis that one proportion is statistically significantly greater than the other, controlling for 
sample size. If the null hypothesis is accepted over the alternative hypothesis, then one may conclude that 
the difference in proportions is due to chance. 
149 The p value of a hypothesis test is the probability, calculated assuming the null hypothesis is true (e.g., 
the proportions are equal), of observing any outcome as extreme or more extreme than the observed 
outcome. “Extreme” means in the direction of the alternative hypothesis. In this case, there is a 20% chance 
of observing these proportions given that they are equal to one another. This is fairly high; so, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the proportions are equal. Customarily, in social science research, a null 
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does not allow us to determine whether this trend is due to the relative emphasis courts 
place on whether the information is intrinsic or the general decrease over time in the 
likelihood that courts will find the existence of a duty to disclose.150  
d. Section Summary 
In sum, although the lack of variation in the INTRINSIC variable did not allow 
the use of regression analysis to determine the variable’s impact, if any, on case 
outcomes, several lessons emerge from this exercise.  First, claims by commentators as to 
the impact of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction on case outcomes should be viewed with 
caution.  The same lack of variation that confounds our attempts at regression analysis 
makes drawing inferences about the variable’s impact on case outcomes from reading a 
select number of non-randomly chosen cases problematic.  Second, tests for the equality 
of proportions cast doubt on claims that courts are more likely to require the disclosure of 
intrinsic information than extrinsic information. 
2. Whether the information involves personal intentions or opinions, as opposed 
to facts, does not explain the variation in case outcomes because the number of cases 
involving such information is too small to obtain useful results from regression analysis. 
Outcome counts, however, cast doubt on the conventional wisdom relating to personal 
intentions.   
 
Recall that there is almost universal agreement among commentators that the 
disclosure of personal intentions or opinions is not required by the common law.151 The 
results presented in Table 4 indicate that the coefficient on PERSONAL is significant and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
hypothesis is rejected in favor of an alternative hypothesis if the p value is less than 5% (in some cases, a 
10% cutoff is used). In all cases, we report the exact p values derived from the statistical tests. 
150 In theory, it is possible to control for the general trend over time and other influences on court decisions, 
by estimating the influence of intrinsic information over time using a logistic regression that includes the 
20 variables representing case characteristics and YEAR, together with a term to capture the interaction of 
year and intrinsic information (INTRINSIC * YEAR). The coefficient on the interaction term would allow 
us to determine whether courts were more or less likely to require disclosure in cases involving intrinsic 
information in later years relative to earlier years. The coefficient on the interaction term was not 
statistically significantly different from zero (p = 0.67). However, due to the lack of variation in the 
INSTRINSIC variable, this regression result does not provide us with any useful information. See supra 
notes  140-141 and accompanying text (discussing problems arising from the fact that 97% of the cases 
involve intrinsic information.) 
151 See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
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negative (p = 0.01) when we control only for variables relating to the type of information. 
When we control for all case characteristics, however, the coefficient loses significance. 
When all variables are included in the model the coefficient on PERSONAL is 
insignificant (p > 0.10), indicating that whether the information is a personal opinion or 
intention versus a fact is not a factor that helps to explain the variation in case outcomes. 
It should be noted, however, that this result most likely is driven by the fact that only 9% 
of the cases in the full sample involve personal intentions or opinions. The number of 
these sorts of cases might be too small to accurately identify the effect of this variable on 
the likelihood of mandated disclosure.  
Nonetheless, simple outcome counts cast doubt on the conventional wisdom 
relating to the disclosure of personal intentions or opinions. Recall that consensus on the 
theory that the common law does not require the disclosure of personal intentions or 
opinions is so widespread that we hypothesized, first, that very few such cases are 
actually brought and, second, that when such cases do result in a decision the court nearly 
always permits such information to be withheld. The results of the outcome count do not 
support either prediction regarding personal intentions or opinions.152  Of the 466 cases in 
the sample, 41 (or 9%) involve information that was personal in nature.153  In a 
substantial portion of these cases (12 of the 41), the court ruled that the informed party 
had a duty to disclose the withheld opinion or intention. 
3. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the withheld 
information relates to a latent defect. 
  
152 It is important to note that simple counts do not control for the effects of other variables of interest. 
Results obtained from simple counts must be viewed with this limitation in mind. 
153 We can rule out the fact that the lack of cases is attributable to courts’ reluctance to impose liability for 
failure to disclose personal intentions or opinions in early cases, causing plaintiffs to eventually abandon 
such claims.  Cases involving personal intentions or opinions appeared in the data set uniformly over time. 
The first case of this sort was decided in 1852, five others were decided prior to 1950, and the remaining 
cases were decided after 1950. 
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We hypothesized that courts would be more likely to require disclosure when the 
informed party withholds information relating to a latent defect. The results presented in 
Table 4 support this claim. The coefficient on LATENT is positive and highly significant 
(p = 0.00), even when we control for all variables relating to case characteristics. In this 
case it appears that the commentators have correctly argued that this factor significantly 
influences courts’ decisions in fraudulent silence cases.  
4. Whether the undisclosed information would likely cause bodily injury or 
property damage does not explain the variation in the case outcomes, most likely because 
the number of cases involving such information is too small to obtain useful results from 
regression analysis. Outcome counts, however, suggest that our hypotheses regarding 
information of this sort are not supported strongly by the data. 
 
We hypothesized that the withholding of information likely to cause physical 
injury or property damage increases the likelihood of court-mandated disclosure. We 
coded cases separately for information concerning a defect likely to cause bodily injury 
(INJURE) and information concerning a defect likely to cause property damage 
(DAMAGE). The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the coefficients on INJURE 
and DAMAGE are insignificant (p > 0.10 in all cases). We note, however, that very few 
cases involving information of this sort were present in our dataset. Only 3% of the cases 
included in the full sample involve information likely to cause bodily injury and 8% of 
the cases involve information likely to lead to property damage. Therefore, the number of 
these sorts of cases might be too small to accurately identify the effect of these variables 
on the likelihood of mandated disclosure.  
Again we performed simple counts, the results of which shed light on whether 
courts are more likely to require disclosure of information regarding defects likely to 
cause physical injury or property damage. The results do not support our hypothesis that 
courts are more likely to require disclosure of this sort of information. Of the 12 cases 
involving information likely to result in physical injury, 8 (or 67%) resulted in a finding 
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that the informed party had a duty to disclose. Likewise, in 64% of cases (or 23 of 36) 
involving information likely to result in property damage, the court found a duty to 
disclose. Therefore, while courts tend to rule for the uninformed party slightly more often 
when bodily injury or property damage is at stake (courts require disclosure in about 50% 
of cases not involving such information), these case outcomes are not nearly as uniform 
as one might expect, given the statements of legal commentators.   
As with the INTRINSIC variable, an interesting question here is why there are so 
few decisions involving information that could prevent bodily injury or property 
damage.154  One possibility is that these cases settle, because the plaintiff (who, by 
definition, has suffered bodily injury or property damage) seems sympathetic and the 
defendant’s behavior appears more egregious in comparison. In addition, it might be that 
cases of this sort give rise to other claims, such as negligence, and lawyers representing 
injured parties simply might not include additional claims for fraudulent silence. Finally, 
it is possible that failures to disclose information regarding defects likely to lead to 
injuries or property damage simply occur with lower frequency than nondisclosures of 
other types of information.  Obviously, we cannot test this conjecture using our data. 
5. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the withheld 
information would have updated or corrected previously disclosed information. 
  
We hypothesized that courts would be more likely to require disclosure when the 
undisclosed information would have updated or corrected previously disclosed 
information. The results presented in Table 4 support this claim. The coefficient on 
UP_CORR is positive and highly significant (p = 0.01) when we control for all variables 
relating to case characteristics. In this case it appears that the commentators have 
correctly argued that this factor significantly influences courts’ decisions in fraudulent 
silence cases.  
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B. The Type of Transaction 
Recall that commentators have argued that the type of transaction in question 
influences courts’ decisions in fraudulent silence cases. In particular, claims have been 
made that courts are more likely to require disclosure in transactions between parties in a 
confidential or fiduciary relationship; transactions concerning the acquisition of 
insurance, surety, or a release from liability; transactions in which the parties have 
unequal access to information; transactions concerning the transfer of real property; and 
transactions concerning the sale or transfer of a slave.155 
1. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the contracting 
parties are in a confidential or fiduciary relationship. 
  
We hypothesized that courts would be more likely to require disclosure when the 
contracting parties are in a confidential or fiduciary relationship. The results presented in 
Table 4 support this claim. The coefficient on CONFID is positive and highly significant 
(p = 0.00), even when we control for all variables relating to case characteristics. In this 
case it appears that the commentators have correctly argued that, when the parties are in a 
confidential or fiduciary relationship, courts are more likely to require disclosure. 
2. Whether the transaction concerned insurance or a release from liability does 
not explain the variation in case outcomes, most likely because the number of cases 
involving such a transaction is too small to obtain useful results from regression analysis. 
Outcome counts, however, suggest that our hypotheses regarding information of this sort 
are not supported strongly by the data. 
 
We hypothesized that decisions involving transactions related to insurance, 
surety, or a release from liability were more likely to result in the imposition of liability 
for nondisclosure of information. We coded INSURANCE and RELEASE separately.  
However, only one case in our sample involved surety.  Therefore, we coded the single 
surety case as an insurance case. The independent variable INSURE thus represents cases 
 
154 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.  
155 See supra notes 43-70 and accompanying text. 
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related to insurance and one case related to surety. RELEASE represents cases related to 
releases from liability.  
The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the coefficients on INSURE and 
RELEASE are insignificant (p > 0.10 in all cases). We note again, however, that there are 
very few decisions involving information of this sort. Only 7% of the cases included in 
the full sample involve insurance transactions and only 3% of the cases involve releases 
from liability. Therefore, the number of these sorts of cases might be too small to 
accurately identify the effect of these variables on the likelihood of mandated disclosure.  
Again, we used simple outcome counts to determine whether courts are more 
likely to require disclosure of information when the transaction involves insurance or a 
release from liability. The results do not support our hypothesis that courts are more 
likely to require disclosure of this sort of information. Of the 32 cases involving 
insurance contracts, the court found a duty to disclose in 20 (or 63%). Likewise, courts 
found a duty to disclose in 60% of cases (or 9 of 15) involving releases from liability. 
Therefore, while courts tend to find a duty to disclose in a somewhat slight majority of 
cases involving insurance or releases from liability, courts do not force disclosure in an 
overwhelming number of such cases. 
3. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the transaction 
was one in which the parties had unequal access to information.  However, our analysis 
indicates that the presence of unequal access in combination with the casual acquisition 
of information is the actual driver of case outcomes.    
 
Recall from Section II that one of the liveliest debates in this literature is whether 
unequal access to information has a significant influence on the probability that courts 
will require the disclosure of material information.  Of particular interest has been the 
debate between proponents of the equal access theory and proponents of the deliberately 
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acquired information theory.156  The results reveal that if the parties had unequal access 
to the undisclosed information, courts are more likely to find that the informed party had 
a duty to disclose. The coefficient on ACCESS is positive and highly significant (p = 
0.00), even when we control for all variables relating to case characteristics. 
To ensure fair testing of the equal access theory we ran two additional 
regressions.  First, Scheppele’s assertions about the state of the law were published in 
1988.  Accordingly, if changes in the law caused courts to decide fraudulent silence cases 
differently after 1988, a regression on our full dataset might fail to support the equal 
access theory, even if Scheppele’s assertions were correct when made.  To test this 
possibility, we ran a second regression using only cases decided from 1793 to 1987. 
Under this specification, the coefficient on ACCESS remains positive and highly 
significant (p = 0.008; n = 264) 
Second, it is possible that Scheppele was actually reporting a perceived trend in 
the law based on a reading of several recent, important cases that she believed signaled a 
development in existing law.  If this is the case, then a regression on cases decided up to 
the date of her statements would not pick up that trend, as the small number of recent, 
important cases would be outweighed by the larger number of older cases decided under 
the prior rule of law.  To test this possibility we ran a third regression using only cases 
decided from 1989 to 2002. Under this specification, the coefficient on ACCESS is 
insignificant (p = 0.17; n = 190), indicating that, in later cases, unequal access to 
information is not a driving force behind decisions on the duty element. Therefore, our 
data do not support the claim that Scheppele was reporting a perceived trend or change in 
the law. 
156 Compare Scheppele, supra note 2 (arguing that outcomes in fraudulent silence cases are best explained 
by the equal access theory) with Kronman, supra note 1 (arguing that outcomes in fraudulent silence cases 
are best explained by the fact that some information is casually acquired and some information is 
deliberately acquired). 
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Our results thus shed light on this long-standing debate and, at least initially, lend 
some support to the proponents of the equal access theory.  Particularly when viewed in 
light of the results on cases involving casually acquired information,157 our analysis 
seems to support the equal access proponents as opposed to those who claim that judges 
primarily consider economic efficiency in deciding case outcomes.  
 Because Scheppele relied on many of the same cases employed by Kronman to 
develop her theory, we thought it probable that both unequal access and casually acquired 
information were present in those cases requiring disclosure that the two authors 
examined.  In other words, we surmised that both Kronman and Scheppele may have 
looked at a particular set of cases in which disclosure was required, the information was 
casually acquired, and the parties had unequal access.  However, whereas Kronman 
concluded that the casually acquired nature of the information drove case outcomes, 
Scheppele concluded that it was the unequal access of the parties that affected case 
outcomes.  In contrast, we hypothesized that perhaps it is the presence of unequal access 
and casually acquired information together, rather than either factor separately, that 
actually drives case outcomes.   
To test this claim, we used a logistic regression and included all 20 variables 
representing case characteristics and an interaction term, CASUAL * ACCESS.158  When 
we include this interaction term, we find that the coefficient on the interaction term is 
statistically significant and positive (p = 0.04).  At the same time, the coefficients on 
CASUAL and ACCESS both become insignificant (p = 0.86 and p = 0.72, respectively).   
157 See infra Section IV.C. 
158 The variable ACCESS and the interaction term (CASUAL * ACCESS) are strongly positively correlated 
(r = 0.80). Therefore, we checked for problems related to multicollinearity. When we regress ACCESS on 
all the other independent variables and CASUAL * ACCESS, the tolerance is equal to 0.19. This means 
that 19% of the variation in the ACCESS variable is not explained by the other independent variables. We 
get a similar measure of tolerance when we regress the interaction term on all the independent variables. 
Tolerances of 5% or less are cause for concern. Thus, we are confident that our results are not significantly 
affected by multicollinearity. 
  
 63
                                                          
These results suggest that courts are more likely to find a duty to disclose when 
both of these factors are present, but not when either is present alone.  Accordingly, our 
analysis indicates that each side of this heated debate is both right and wrong at the same 
time.  Although whether or not the parties to the transaction had equal access to 
information and whether the informed party casually acquired the information both 
impact the probability that a court will mandate disclosure, as suggested by participants 
in the debate, it is only the presence of both factors together that significantly impacts 
case outcomes.   
4. Whether the transaction involved the transfer of real property does not explain 
the variation in case outcomes when we control for all case characteristics.  
 
As we discussed in Section II, some commentators claim that courts are more 
likely to require disclosure when the contract involves the transfer of real property.159  
The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the coefficient on PROPERTY is highly 
significant and positive (p = 0.00) when we control only for variables relating to the type 
of transaction. When we control for all case characteristics, however, the coefficient loses 
significance. When all variables related to case characteristics are included in the model 
the coefficient on PROPERTY becomes insignificant (p > 0.10), indicating that courts’ 
decisions in cases involving the transfer of real property are actually driven by other 
variables that are present in these sorts of cases.160   
5. Three cases involving the sale or transfer of a slave appear in the dataset, and 
in each case the court found that the informed party had a duty to disclose. We were 
forced to drop the variable SLAVE from the regression analysis because it is a perfect 
predictor of case outcome.  
 
Although we predicted in Section II that courts are more likely to impose 
disclosure duties in cases involving the sale or transfer of a slave, we were not able to test 
159 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
160 To test the most obvious potential variables driving the real property cases, we ran two logistic 
regressions that included all 20 variables related to case characteristics and an interaction term for either 
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this claim using regression analysis to control for the effects of other case characteristics 
because SLAVE is a perfect predictor of whether the court required disclosure. In all 
three cases involving the sale or transfer of a slave, the court held that the informed party 
had a duty to disclose. Therefore, although only three cases in our sample involve the sale 
or transfer of a slave, the fact that all three require disclosure is at least consistent with 
claims by some commentators that courts vigilantly police such transactions.     
C. How the Information Was Acquired 
As discussed in Section II, commentators also have argued that the method the 
informed party used to acquire the undisclosed information influences the likelihood that 
courts will impose a duty to disclose on parties to a transaction.  In particular, 
commentators have argued that courts more frequently require the disclosure of casually 
acquired information and information acquired through illegal or tortious means. 
1. The results provide very weak support, if any, for the claim that courts are 
more likely to require the disclosure of casually, as opposed to deliberately, acquired 
information.  However, our analysis indicates that, if the parties lacked equal access to 
the information and the information was acquired casually, courts are more likely to 
require disclosure.161 
 
a. General Results 
Recall from Section II that Kronman contends that courts hesitate to require the 
disclosure of information deliberately acquired by the informed party.162  We suggest, 
however, that because distinguishing between deliberately acquired and casually acquired 
information is difficult in practice, this factor has not strongly influenced decisions by 
courts in fraudulent silence cases. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
PROPERTY * LATENT or PROPERTY * BUYER.  In both cases, the interaction term was insignificant, 
meaning that neither LATENT nor BUYER drives the outcomes in property cases.  
161 See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text (discussing the interaction of ACCESS with CASUAL). 
162 See supra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing the Kronman theory). As previously noted, 
Kronman limits his claims to socially productive information, a distinction that we find irrelevant for the 
purposes of this study.  See supra note __ (discussing this fact). 
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The results presented in Table 4 are mixed on this factor. When we control only 
for factors relating to how the information was acquired, the coefficient on CASUAL is 
insignificant (p = 0.71). When we control for all case characteristics, however, the 
coefficient becomes positive and weakly significant (p = 0.06), suggesting that courts 
might be more likely to require disclosure when the information is casually acquired as 
opposed to deliberately acquired. 
It is important to note here that the result related to this variable is not robust to 
other specifications that include variables for the year in which the case was decided, the 
geographic region in which the court sits, and the jurisdiction of the court.163 As 
presented in Table 6, when we control for the case characteristics and (1) the decision 
year, or (2) the geographic region, or (3) whether the court is a state or federal court, the 
coefficient on CASUAL remains positive and weakly significant (0.10 > p > 0.05). On 
the other hand, when we control for (1) the case characteristics together with the circuit in 
which the court sits, or (2) all independent variables that we coded, the coefficient on 
CASUAL becomes insignificant (p > 0.10). 
To ensure a fair test of Kronman’s claims, we ran two additional regressions.  
First, Kronman developed his theory based on an examination of the law in 1978.  As a 
result, if a change in the law of fraudulent silence caused courts to decide cases 
differently after 1978, then a regression on the full dataset could unfairly reject 
Kronman’s hypothesis.  Accordingly, we ran a second regression using only cases 
decided from 1793 to 1977. In this specification, which controls only for the case 
characteristics and not year of decision, jurisdiction, or geographic region, the coefficient 
on CASUAL remains positive and weakly significant (p = 0.08; n = 204).  
163 General results for specifications including these additional variables are presented infra in Sections 
IV.F and IV.G. 
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Second, Kronman may actually have been reporting a perceived trend or change 
in the law based on the outcomes of a few recently decided, important cases that he 
believed signaled a change in existing law.  If this is true, then a regression on cases 
decided up to the time Kronman made his statements would not pick up this trend, 
because the many older cases following the prior rule of law would obscure the impact of 
the more recent, important cases asserting a new rule of law.  To test this possibility, we 
ran a regression using only cases decided from 1979 to 2002. In this specification, again 
controlling only for case characteristics, the coefficient on CASUAL becomes 
insignificant (p = 0.22; n = 255), indicating that whether the information was casually, 
rather than deliberately, acquired has no significant influence on whether the court finds a 
duty to disclose in the later cases. Therefore, our data do not support the claim that 
Kronman was reporting a perceived trend or change in the law. 
b. Assumptions Regarding the Means of Information Acquisition 
Recall that Kronman contends that, because it is inefficient for courts to make 
case-by-case determinations of whether information is casually or deliberately acquired, 
courts instead lay down blanket rules about what class of case is most likely to involve 
deliberately or causally acquired information.  In contrast, we coded cases on an 
individual basis, by analyzing the specific facts of each case.  Accordingly, our study was 
not designed to test precisely the Kronman hypothesis. 
Nonetheless, coding in this manner allows us to test whether or not Kronman was 
correct in his assumptions about how certain types of information are normally acquired.  
Recall for example that Kronman asserts that whether or not information is extrinsic or 
intrinsic appears to be relevant to court decisions only because extrinsic information is 
typically deliberately acquired, and courts are concerned with protecting parties who have 
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deliberately acquired their information.164 To test the claim that extrinsic information is 
typically deliberately acquired we performed simple counts. Of the 14 cases in our data 
set that involve extrinsic information, eight (or 57%) involve information that was 
causally acquired. This result does not lend much support to Kronman’s characterization 
of the typical method of acquiring extrinsic information.  
Similarly, Kronman asserts that whether or not the transaction concerned the 
transfer of real property appears to be relevant to courts only because information 
relevant to the transfer of real property is typically casually acquired, and courts are more 
likely to require the disclosure of casually acquired information.  To test the claim that 
information relevant to the transfer of real property is typically casually acquired, we 
performed simple counts.  Of the 157 cases in our data set that involve information 
concerning the transfer of real property, 124 (or 79%) involve casually acquired 
information.  In this instance, at least, Kronman’s hypothesis about the manner of 
information acquisition appears largely correct.  
Finally, Kronman argues that whether or not a defect is latent or patent appears to 
drive case outcomes only because information concerning a latent defect is typically 
casually acquired, and courts require the disclosure of casually acquired information.  To 
test the claim that information concerning a latent defect is typically casually acquired we 
preformed simple counts.  Of the 60 cases in our data set that involve information 
concerning a latent defect, 54 (or 90%) involved casually acquired information.  In this 
instance, again, Kronman’s prediction about the method by which such information is 
acquired seems accurate. 
Of course these results do not take into account cases that are not ultimately 
decided by the court, and there is reason to believe that claims that settle or are never 
164 See supra Section II.  
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filed are different in important ways from claims that result in decisions. Without access 
to this information, we are not able to adequately evaluate Kronman’s claims about the 
likely means of information acquisition in all cases.   
c. Section Summary 
In sum, although some of Kronman’s theories about the typical method of 
information acquisition are supported by the data, his theories are ultimately based on an 
assumption that case outcomes depend on whether the information was casually or 
deliberately acquired.  Although the coefficient on CASUAL is weakly significant in 
some specifications, the p value is never below 5% and in many specifications, including 
the full specification, the coefficient is insignificant.  Given these results, conjectures as 
to the interaction of the CASUAL variable with other variables (such as whether the 
information was extrinsic, whether it related to the transfer of real property, and whether 
it related to a latent defect) are misplaced. We do find, however, that, if the information 
was acquired casually and the parties lacked equal access to the information, courts are 
more likely to require disclosure.165 
2. Whether the information was acquired through illegal or tortious means does 
not explain the variation in case outcomes because the number of cases involving such 
information is too small to obtain useful results from regression analysis. Outcome 
counts provide limited support for the hypothesis that courts are more likely to impose 
disclosure duties on contracting parties when the information is acquired through illegal 
or tortious means.   
 
We hypothesized that if the informed party acquires information using illegal or 
tortious means courts are more likely to hold that the informed party owed the 
uninformed party a duty to disclose. The results presented in Table 4 demonstrate that the 
coefficient on ILLEGAL is insignificant (p > 0.10), indicating that this factor does not 
help to explain the variation in case outcomes. It should be noted, however, that this 
result most likely is driven by the fact that only 1% of the cases in the full sample involve 
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information of this sort. The number of these sorts of cases might be too small to 
accurately identify the effect of this variable on the likelihood of mandated disclosure.  
Nonetheless, simple outcome counts provide some support for our hypothesis 
relating to the disclosure of illegally acquired information. Of the four cases in the 
sample involving information acquired illegally or tortiously, three cases (or 75%) 
resulted in the imposition of liability for fraudulent silence. The results of the outcome 
count thus provide some support for the claim that courts are more likely to impose a 
duty to disclose on the informed party when  the withheld information is acquired 
illegally or tortiously, although the support is weak given that our sample includes a very 
small number of such cases. 
As with cases involving extrinsic information, information likely to cause bodily 
injury or property damage, information relating to personal intentions or opinions, 
information relating to the acquisition of insurance or a release from liability, and 
information relating to the sale of a slave, a relevant question is why so few cases 
involving information acquired by illegal or tortious means result in decisions.  One 
possibility is that such cases settle early because the defendant is unsympathetic (having 
violated the law or committed a tort).  Accordingly, such defendants might fear that 
courts will treat them more harshly, and would prefer to avoid the costs and potential bad 
publicity associated with litigation.  If true, this fear regarding the impact of the informed 
party’s behavior on the case outcome is consistent with our findings regarding court 
decisions when the informed party has engaged in other types of bad behavior, such as 
concealing information, lying, or telling a half-truth.166     
 
 
 
165 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
166 See infra section IV.E. (discussing the impact of the informed party’s behavior on case outcomes). 
  
 70
                                                          
D. Characteristics of the Uninformed Party 
As discussed in Section II, we hypothesized that court decisions are influenced by 
particular characteristics of the uninformed party, including whether the uninformed 
party is a buyer or lessee, is female, or is sick, disabled, illiterate, elderly, or otherwise 
severely disadvantaged in the bargaining relationship, although still competent to 
contract.  
1. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the uninformed 
party is a buyer or lessee. 
  
We hypothesized that courts would be more likely to require disclosure when the 
uninformed party is the buyer or lessee, as opposed to the seller. The results presented in 
Table 4 support this claim. The coefficient on BUYER is positive and highly significant 
(p ≤ 0.01), even when we control for all variables relating to case characteristics. In this 
case, it appears that the commentators have correctly argued that courts impose higher 
disclosure duties on sellers than on purchasers. 
2. Whether the uninformed party was female does not seem to be a factor that 
influences courts’ decisions regarding fraudulent silence.  However, the percentage of 
cases in which the uninformed party is female and disclosure is required decreased 
significantly from the period 1793-1950 to the period 1951-2002167.    
 
As discussed in Section II, we hypothesized that a duty to disclose information is 
more likely to be found when the uninformed party is female, especially in older cases. 
The results presented in Table 4, however, indicate that the coefficient on FEMALE is 
insignificant (p > 0.10) in all specifications. These results suggest that courts are not 
significantly influenced by the gender of the uninformed party when determining the 
disclosure duties of bargaining parties.  
167 We chose to divide the data set into these time periods for specific reasons, including: that the split 
resulted in roughly equal sample sizes of cases involving uninformed females, and that public perceptions 
regarding the competence of women involved in commercial and business transactions may have begun to 
change around this time. 
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To test whether courts’ positions with respect to the level of disclosure required 
by the informed party when the uninformed party is female changed over time, we 
performed simple counts.  Prior to 1950, 24 cases involved an uninformed party who was 
female, and 20 cases (or 83%) required disclosure.  In contrast, in the period from 1950 
to May 15, 2002, 31 cases involved an uninformed party who was female and 13 cases 
(or 42%) required disclosure.  A test of the equality of proportions indicates that this 
difference is statistically significant (p = 0.001).  Although, when we control for all other 
variables relating to case characteristics, FEMALE does not seem to influence court 
decisions, we do find that in cases in which the uninformed party is female courts were 
much more likely to require disclosure in cases decided prior to 1950 than in post-1950 
cases.   
3. Courts are statistically significantly more likely to require disclosure when the 
uninformed party was sick, disabled, illiterate, or elderly, though competent to contract, 
although the statistical significance of the influence of this variable varies with the 
specification of the statistical model. 
  
As discussed in Section II, we hypothesized that courts express sympathy for 
uninformed parties who are sick, disabled, illiterate or elderly, though still competent to 
contract, by being more likely to rule in their favor because of these factors. The results 
presented in Table 4 support this claim. The coefficient on SICK is positive and 
significant (p ≤ 0.10) in all specifications. Note, however, that the significance of the 
coefficient varies with the specification; in some cases the coefficient is statistically 
significant at only the 10% level (e.g., Table 6 indicates a p value of 0.06 when we 
control for all case characteristics, case decision year, geographic region and 
jurisdiction). Although the evidence is weak for some specifications of the empirical 
model, our intuition that when the uninformed party is sympathetic in these particular 
ways courts are more likely to require disclosure appears to have been correct. 
E. Behavior of the Informed Party 
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As discussed in Section II, we hypothesized that courts consider the general 
behavior of the informed party when deciding the extent to which secret information 
must be disclosed to the uninformed party.  Specifically, we predicted that when the 
informed party made affirmative misrepresentations or told half-truths in the same 
transaction in which the alleged omission occurred and when the informed party actively 
concealed information, courts are more likely to find a duty to disclose. 
1. Courts are more likely to require disclosure if the court finds that the informed 
party made affirmative misrepresentations or told half-truths in the same transaction in 
which the alleged omission occurred.   
 
In Section II, we predicted that courts’ decisions regarding whether material 
information must be revealed to the uninformed party are influenced by the general 
behavior of the informed party. Specifically, if the informed party was found to have 
made an affirmative misrepresentation or told a half-truth to the uninformed party in the 
same transaction in which the alleged omission occurred, we hypothesized that the court 
would be more likely to rule against the informed party in the separate fraudulent silence 
claim. The results presented in Table 4 support both of these claims. The coefficients on 
LIED and HALF-TRUTH are positive and highly significant (p = 0.00). When we control 
for the case decision year and the geographic region and jurisdiction of the court, the 
coefficients remain positive and highly significant (p = 0.00).  Therefore, the data provide 
strong support for the prediction that courts are influenced by the general bad behavior of 
the informed party.  
2. A court is more likely to find a duty to disclose if it finds that the informed party 
actively concealed the withheld information. 
 
As discussed in Section II, we also hypothesized that another form of bad 
behavior on the part of the defendant – the active concealment of information – increases 
the probability that the court will require disclosure.  The results presented in Table 4 
support this claim. The coefficient on CONCEAL is positive and highly significant (p = 
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0.00). When we control for the case decision year and the geographic region and 
jurisdiction of the court, the coefficient remains positive and highly significant (p = 0.00).  
Therefore, the data provide strong support for the claim that actions taken by the 
informed party to conceal information influence courts’ decisions regarding the 
imposition of disclosure duties.  When taken together with the findings on LIED and 
HALF-TRUTH discussed in Part IV. E.1. supra, the data strongly support the theory that 
courts account for the informed party’s behavior in determining whether a duty to 
disclose existed. 
F. Case Date 
Recall from section II that many commentators argue that courts have become 
more pro-disclosure during the time period over which our data span. In addition, some 
commentators have made more specific claims about changes in the doctrine or 
application of the doctrine over time. In this section we investigate these claims about 
trends over time and discuss some interesting patterns in the data revealed by our study. 
1. Basic regression analyses do not support the claim that courts have become 
more likely to require the disclosure of material information over time. 
 
Table 6 presents results from tests of the influences of case decision date on the 
likelihood that the court will rule that the informed party had a duty to disclose the 
withheld information to the uninformed party.168  
The results related to the general trend over time are quite striking. First, while 
most commentators claim that courts are more likely to require disclosure in more recent 
cases, results generated by logistic regression analysis reported in Table 6 suggest that 
courts are less likely to mandate disclosure in recently decided cases. When we control  
for all 20 case characteristics and the case decision year, the coefficient on YEAR is 
negative and statistically significant (p = 0.01). When we add controls for geographic 
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region and jurisdiction of the court, although the coefficient loses some of its 
significance, it remains negative and weakly statistically significant (p = 0.08). 
Although these results provide support for the claim that courts have become less 
likely over time to require the disclosure of material information, testing the claim using 
regression analysis does not allow us to determine whether this development progresses 
in a linear fashion, or is more complicated, with spikes and valleys during particular time 
periods. To investigate this possibility we employed more nuanced statistical tests and 
constructed time series graphs. 
 
168 We also analyzed the data using probit analysis and obtained results that were nearly identical to the 
results we obtained using logistic regression analysis. 
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VARIABLE
Type of Information:
  INTRINSIC 0.16 0.49 - 0.04 0.12 - 0.23 0.13
(0.86) (0.60) (0.96) (0.90) (0.82) (0.99)
  PERSONAL - 0.32 - 0.22 - 0.30 - 0.18 - 0.35 - 0.29
(0.56) (0.69) (0.60) (0.76) (0.56) (0.63)
  LATENT 2.24*** 2.09*** 2.37*** 2.23*** 2.34*** 2.27***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
  INJURE 1.05 0.93 1.16 1.28 1.41 1.27
(0.20) (0.27) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.19)
  DAMAGE - 0.23 0.03 - 0.27 - 0.16 - 0.29 - 0.14
(0.72) (0.97) (0.69) (0.81) (0.68) (0.84)
  UP_CORR 1.06** 1.12** 1.13** 1.14** 1.26** 1.29**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Type of Transaction:
  CONFID 2.65*** 2.42*** 2.84*** 2.50*** 2.68*** 2.70***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
  INSURE - 0.13 - 0.24 - 0.01 - 0.11 - 0.21 - 0.23
(0.84) (0.71) (0.99) (0.86) (0.76) (0.75)
  RELEASE 0.51 0.47 0.51 0.38 0.36 0.35
(0.55) (0.57) (0.58) (0.65) (0.68) (0.70)
  ACCESS 1.03*** 1.05*** 1.03*** 1.11*** 1.24*** 1.20***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
  PROPERTY 0.29 0.26 0.33 0.12 - 0.13 - 0.04
(0.45) (0.50) (0.40) (0.77) (0.76) (0.92)
Type of Acquisition:
  CASUAL 0.76* 0.72* 0.81* 0.67* 0.53 0.52
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.21) (0.23)
  ILLEGAL 1.26 0.99 0.75 1.26 0.84 0.16
(0.46) (0.55) (0.66) (0.44) (0.66) (0.93)
Uninformed Party Characteristics:
  BUYER 1.18*** 1.25*** 1.33*** 1.20*** 1.53*** 1.72***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
  FEMALE 0.04 0.03 0.20 - 0.04 - 0.02 0.17
(0.93) (0.94) (0.67) (0.93) (0.97) (0.74)
  SICK 1.58** 1.42* 1.66** 1.58** 1.72** 1.56*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Informed Party Characteristics:
  LIED 3.17*** 3.17*** 3.22*** 3.23*** 3.49*** 3.52***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
  CONCEAL 3.15*** 3.32*** 3.31*** 3.27*** 3.44*** 3.65***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
  HALF_TRUTH 2.81*** 2.69*** 2.87*** 2.73*** 2.91*** 2.88***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
YEAR - 0.01** - 0.01*
(0.01) (0.08)
Geographic Region:
  WEST 0.68 0.45
(0.17) (0.42)
  SOUTH 0.19 0.20
(0.67) (0.69)
  MIDATLANTIC 1.13** 0.97*
(0.01) (0.07)
  SOUTHWEST 1.35** 1.22*
(0.03) (0.07)
  NEW ENGLAND 0.67 0.58
(0.26) (0.37)
Jurisdiction:
  STATE 0.75** - 1.39
(0.04) (0.28)
  3RD CIRCUIT - 1.20 - 2.86*
(0.26) (0.08)
  6TH CIRCUIT - 3.20** - 4.70**
(0.02) (0.02)
  7TH CIRCUIT - 2.90** - 3.74**
(0.02) (0.05)
Controls for all circuits included † YES YES
Constant -4.41*** 13.55* -5.03*** -4.84*** -3.86*** 11.09
(0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19)
LR Χ2 310.58 317.23 321.20 314.91 325.54 337.22
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pseudo R2 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.53
N 463 463 463 463 456 456
regression.
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
† Only those circuits for which results are statistically significant appear in the table.
models for the same dependent variable, they lack the straightforward explained-variance interpretation of true R2 in OLS
TABLE 6: This table provides the maximum-likelihood logit estimation results for the effects of case characteristics, including   
Note: LR Χ2 indicates the result from testing the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the model, except the constant, equal    
(P VALUE)
the decision date, geographic location of the court (Midwest used as base) and jurisdiction of the court, on whether the
court found a duty to disclose. 
TABLE 6
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS INCLUDING YEAR, REGION AND JURISDICTION
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PREDICTED LOG ODDS OF COURT FINDING DUTY TO DISCLOSE
zero. In addition, it should be noted that, although pseudo R2 statistics provide a quick way to compare the fit of different
COEFFICIENT
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2. Analyses using simple tabulations do not support the claim that courts have 
been more likely to require disclosure in cases decided in later years. 
 
We employed simple tabulations, the results of which are reported in Table 7, to 
check for differences between particular time periods using the entire sample. 
PERIOD
COURT 
FOUND DUTY 
TO DISCLOSE
COURT FOUND 
NO DUTY TO 
DISCLOSE
1793-1860 10 (67%) 5 (33%)
1861-1940 89 (71%) 37 (29%)
1941-2002 138 (42%) 187 (58%)
TABLE 7
TABULATIONS FOR CASES OVER VARIOUS 
PERIODS
TABLE 7: This table presents the results of 
tabulations of the number of cases by outcome for 
three periods: 1793-1860, 1861-1940 and 1941-2002.  
 
We found that, prior to 1860, courts found a duty to disclose in 67% of cases (or 
10 of 15). Between 1861 and 1940, the years roughly between the Civil War and the start 
of World War II, courts found a duty to disclose in 71% of cases (or 89 of 126). Finally, 
in 42% of cases (or 138 of 325) decided between 1941 and 2002, the court ruled that the 
informed party had a duty to disclose.  A test for the equality of proportions calculated 
for the first two periods indicates that no statistically significant difference exists between 
the proportions (p = 0.62). On the other hand, the difference between the proportions 
calculated for the period 1861-1940 and 1941-2002 is statistically significant (p = 0.00). 
These results do not support claims about an increase in the likelihood that courts will 
require disclosure due to the shift from an agrarian to a commercial economy.  In fact, the 
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data indicates the opposite – courts have been less likely to require the disclosure of 
material information from World War II to the present than they were during the period 
from the Civil Car until World War II. 
3. A time series graph of the dependent variable does not support the claim that 
courts have been more likely over time to require informed parties to disclose 
information to uninformed parties, but the graphs reveal an interesting pattern when 
compared to a time series graph of the number of fraudulent silence decisions across 
time. 
 
To get a better sense of the pattern of court decisions over time, we graphed the 
proportion of fraudulent silence cases in which the court found that the informed party 
owed the uninformed party a duty to disclose (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Proportion of Cases in Which the Court Found a Duty to Disclose
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The graph clearly reveals that the probability of the court imposing a disclosure 
duty on the informed party decreases almost linearly over time, especially in the years 
after 1970—the years in which most of the cases in our data set were decided. This 
observation further supports the findings obtained from the regression analyses. The 
  
 78
likelihood of the existence of a non-linear relationship between time and the probability 
of the court requiring disclosure seems remote given the pattern in the dependent variable 
over time revealed in Figure 1. 
It is also interesting to note that the number of decisions involving the issue of 
whether the informed party owed a duty of disclosure significantly increased over time, 
again especially in the years after 1970. Figure 2 presents a graph of the number of 
fraudulent silence decisions by five-year periods.169  There are a small number of 
decisions during the five-year periods prior to 1900; therefore, we focus mainly on two 
trends in the data relating to the 20th Century. 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of Fraudulent Silence Decisions by Outcome
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Note: Recall that our data set includes cases decided through May 15, 2002. The striped bars represent projections for 
the period May 15, 2002 though 2005. The vertical line separates cases decided prior to 1944, all of which are included 
in our data set, from cases decided during or after 1944, a random sample of which is included in our data set.  
                                                          
169 Recall that for the years prior to 1944, all relevant cases were included in the data set; whereas, for 1944 
and subsequent years, a random sample of the cases was included in the data set. The vertical line drawn in 
Figure 2 divides these periods. For this reason, the increase in the number of decided cases is actually 
understated in the Figure. 
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By examining Figures 1 and 2 simultaneously, we find that, especially in the 
years subsequent to 1970, the courts become less likely to require disclosure, while, 
during the same period, a significantly increasing number of decisions appear in our 
dataset. On its face, this result seems counter-intuitive. One might predict that, as the 
probability of winning at trial decreases, fewer uninformed parties will bring claims and 
more will settle prior to resolution by the court.170  
To explain this seemingly odd result, one would need information on filing 
behavior, settlement rates, whether statutes impact the types of cases decided under 
common law, whether the issues on which judges choose to write opinions change over 
time, and how disclosure rules affect individual decisions about whether to disclose 
information. Accordingly, any conjectures made here about what is driving these patterns 
are simply that -- conjectures.  
Nonetheless, one possibility is worth mentioning.  Recall that the existence of a 
duty to disclose is only one element of a fraudulent silence case in which the plaintiff 
must prove other elements, such as scienter, reliance, and materiality, in order to prevail.  
If the increase in the number of fraudulent silence decisions actually reflects an increase 
in the number of such claims that are brought and survive to litigation at the same time 
that the plaintiff’s probability of winning on the duty to disclose element is decreasing,171 
then this could possibly reflect the fact that the plaintiff’s probability of winning on one 
or more of the other elements of a fraudulent silence case (materiality, for example) is 
170 We recognize the possibility that fewer cases are being filed and more cases make it to the decision 
stage as time goes on. Our data, however, do not allow us to investigate the relationship between the 
probability of the court imposing a duty to disclose on the informed party and the number of cases decided 
per year. 
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increasing at an even faster rate.  Naturally, we are unable to test this conjecture using our 
data.  However, our study raises the possibility that a similar study focused on one or 
more of the other elements of a fraudulent silence case would reveal interesting time 
trends as well. 
4. The time trend on the number of fraudulent silence decisions is in marked 
contrast to time trends on the number of decisions in contract cases generally. 
 
In a 2001 study of contract litigation, Marc Galanter found that the volume of 
trials in contract cases increased until 1990, followed by a substantial decline by about 
one-third, culminating in a period of little change from year to year.172  Our data on 
fraudulent silence decisions follow a markedly different pattern.  Rather than decreasing 
during the period after 1990, Figure 2 indicates that fraudulent silence decisions, although 
fluctuating somewhat, generally increased after 1990. 
Of course, several variables affect the number of decisions in contract cases, 
including decisions by informed parties regarding whether to disclose information during 
the contracting process, filing behavior, settlement behavior, and statutory developments. 
Because we lack information relating to those factors, we do not theorize about why 
fraudulent silence decisions do not follow general trends of contract cases.  Once again, 
however, these findings point to areas of potential research for those interested in patterns 
in contract and tort litigation. 
5. The data do not support specific claims made by commentators about trends 
over time. 
 
Some commentators have made more specific claims about trends over time 
relating to the probability that courts will require the disclosure of material information. 
 
171 As noted, an increase in the number of fraudulent silence decisions need not reflect an increase in the 
number of fraudulent silence filings. 
172 Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or May Not Want to Know About 
Contract Litigation, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 577 (2001)  (reporting, for example, that 2,507 contract trials were 
held in federal district court in 1988 while 1,517 trials were held in 1992, 1,081 in 1996 and 902 in 1999). 
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For example, recall from Section II that Horwitz claims that, as the United States 
transitioned from an agrarian to a commercial economy, courts became more likely to 
require the disclosure of information not available to both parties.173 To test this claim, 
we ran a logistic regression controlling for the 20 case characteristics, the year the case 
was decided, and an interaction term (ACCESS * YEAR), to pick up the trend over time 
in cases involving unequal access. The coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant 
(p = 0.72), indicating no significant trend over time exists. Our data thus does not support 
the Horwitz claim regarding changes in this area of the law due to changes in the 
economy. 
In addition, in a paper published in 1984, Kronman claimed that disclosure duties 
relating to latent defects increased dramatically during the 25-year period between 
approximately 1958 and 1983.174 To test this claim, we attempted to employ a logistic 
regression using the 20 variables related to case characteristics. This regression, however, 
failed because many of the variables are perfect predictors of disclosure and several of 
the variables are collinear. Therefore, we employed simple tabulations to test the claim. 
We found that, prior to 1958, courts found a duty to disclose in 15 of the 16 cases (or 
94%) involving latent defects.  In the 25-year period between 1958 and 1983, 12 cases 
involved latent defects and, of those 12 cases, the court found a duty to disclose in 11 (or 
92%). A test for the equality of proportions finds no statistically significant difference 
between the percentages (p = 0.58). Therefore, our data do not support Kronman’s claim 
about the development of the law relating to latent defects. 
G. Court 
1. Courts located in the mid-atlantic states and the southwest are more likely to 
require disclosure than are courts located in other geographic regions. In addition, in 
contrast to the statements of some commentators, courts located in the south are not 
more likely to require disclosure, either during the period over which our data span or 
173 See infra note 105 and accompanying text. 
174 See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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historically. 
 
We coded the cases for the geographic region in which the court sits to determine 
whether any geographic patterns emerged with respect to case outcomes.175 The basic 
regression results presented in Table 6 indicate that courts located in the south, west, and 
northeast are no more likely to impose liability for fraudulent silence than are courts 
located in other regions.176 The results, however, do indicate that courts located in the 
mid-atlantic states and the southwest are more likely to require disclosure than are courts 
located in other regions.  
As discussed in Section II, some commentators have claimed that southern states 
historically were much less likely to impose disclosure duties on bargaining parties than 
were states in other regions. To test this claim, we employed two strategies. First, we ran 
a logistic regression controlling for the 20 case characteristics, the year the case was 
decided, and geographic regions (represented by SOUTH, WEST, MIDATLANTIC, 
SOUTHWEST, and NEWENGLAND with MIDWEST as the base) to test for regional 
differences over particular periods. The first regression, using data only from cases 
decided between 1793 and 1860, failed because several independent variables were 
perfect predictors of the likelihood that the court would mandate disclosure. The second 
regression used data only from cases decided between 1861 and 1940. The coefficient on 
the variable SOUTH is insignificant (p = 0.94), indicating no significant difference 
between cases decided in the south and other regions during this period of time.177  
Our second strategy involved calculating the proportion of cases in each region 
that imposed liability for two early periods: 1793-1860 and 1860-1940. We also 
175 States were assigned to geographic regions using the classification employed by the U.S. Embassy.  The 
classification is available at http://www.usembassy.de/usa/travel-regions.htm. 
176 We used the variable MIDWEST as the base to run the regressions. When we include MIDWEST in the 
model and use another region as the base, we find that the coefficient on MIDWEST is not significantly 
different from zero. Therefore, courts in the midwest are not more or less likely to impose liability for 
fraudulent silence than courts in other regions. 
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performed similar calculations for the period 1941-2002 for purposes of comparison. The 
tabulations by outcome and by region for these three periods are presented in Table 8. 
For the period 1793-1860, only 15 cases are contained in the total sample, and 
only four of those were decided in the south.  In three of the four cases, disclosure was 
required.  This proportion is equivalent to the proportion of cases decided in the mid-
atlantic states in which the court required disclosure.  All other regions require disclosure 
in a smaller percentage of cases. While the number of observations is very small, 
certainly the claim that the south was less likely to require disclosure is not supported by 
the data for this period. 
For the periods 1861-1940 and 1941-2002, tests for the equality of proportions 
were performed to compare the proportion of cases requiring disclosure and decided in 
the south to the proportion of cases requiring disclosure and decided in each of the other 
regions. Five separate tests (one for each region) were performed for each period.178 For 
each test, the hypothesis of equal proportions was tested against an alternative hypothesis 
that the proportion of cases requiring disclosure and decided in the south is significantly 
less than the proportion of cases requiring disclosure and decided in the region of 
comparison.  
 
 
177 For the sake of completeness, we ran the same regression using only cases decided between 1941 and 
2002. Again, the coefficient on SOUTH was not statistically significant (p = 0.92). 
178 In other words, five tests were performed comparing the south with each of the southwest, the west, the 
mid-atlantic states, New England, and the Midwest.   
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SOUTH WEST MIDATLANTIC SOUTHWEST NEW ENGLAND MIDWEST
Disclosure Duty Found 3 (75%) 0 6 (75%) 0 0 (0%) 1 (50%)
Disclosure Duty Not Found 1 (25%) 0 2 (25%) 0 1 (100%) 1 (50%)
SOUTH WEST MIDATLANTIC SOUTHWEST NEW ENGLAND MIDWEST
Disclosure Duty Found 19 (61%) 4 (40%) 29 (91%)*** 4 (67%) 5 (56%) 28 (74%)
Disclosure Duty Not Found 12 (39%) 6 (60%) 3 (9%) 2 (33%) 4 (44%) 10 (26%)
SOUTH WEST MIDATLANTIC SOUTHWEST NEW ENGLAND MIDWEST
Disclosure Duty Found 33 (41%) 34 (61%)** 23 (35%) 14 (47%) 10 (46%) 24 (34%)
Disclosure Duty Not Found 48 (59%) 22 (39%) 43 (65%) 16 (53%) 12 (54%) 46 (66%)
*   Significantly lower proportion of cases decided in the south as compared to this region, at the 10% signficance level (p < 0.10).
** Significantly lower proportion of cases decided in the south as compared to this region, at the 5% signficance level (p < 0.05).
*** Significantly lower proportion of cases decided in the south as compared to this region, at the 1% signficance level (p < 0.01). 
TABLE 8: This table presents the results of tabulations of the number of decisions by outcome and by region for three periods: 1793-1860, 1861-
1940 and 1941-2002. Two-sample, one-sized tests for the equality of proportions were performed to compare the proportion of decisions finding 
a duty to disclose and decided in the south to the proportion of decisions finding a duty to disclose and decided in another region. For each test, 
the null hypothesis of equal proportions was tested against the alternative hypothesis that the proportion of decisions finding a disclosure duty 
and decided in the south is significantly less than the proportion of decisions finding a disclosure duty and decided another region.
TABLE 8
TABULATIONS FOR DECISIONS BY OUTCOME AND BY REGION
1793-1860
1861-1940
1941-2002
 
 
Only two of the ten tests indicate that the south is significantly less likely to 
require disclosure as compared to other geographic regions. First, during the period 1861-
1940 courts in the south were less likely to require disclosure than were courts in the mid-
atlantic states. Second, during the period 1941-2002, courts in the south were less likely 
to require disclosure than were courts in the west. Otherwise, no statistically significant 
difference exists between the proportion of cases decided in the south and finding a duty 
to disclose and the proportion of similarly decided cases in courts located in other 
regions. Therefore, the data do not provide strong support for the claim that southern 
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states historically were less likely to require disclosure as compared to other regions of 
the country. 
2. State courts are no more or less likely than federal courts to require the 
informed party to reveal information to the uninformed party. In addition, the 3rd Circuit, 
6th Circuit, and 7th Circuit are more likely than any other circuit to require disclosure.  
 
As indicated in Section II, we were interested in determining whether courts differ 
by jurisdiction in terms of how likely they are to require disclosure. Specifically, we were 
interested in whether any differences existed between federal and state courts, or among 
the federal appellate circuits. 
The results presented in Table 6 indicate that the coefficient on STATE is 
significant and positive (p = 0.04) when we control only for variables relating to the 20 
case characteristics. When we add controls for the case decision year, geographic regions, 
and federal appellate circuit, however, the coefficient loses significance. When all 
independent variables are included in the model the coefficient on STATE is insignificant 
(p = 0.28), indicating that state courts are no more or less likely to require disclosure than 
are federal courts. 
In addition, the results obtained from the regression analysis (see Table 6) 
indicate that three federal appellate jurisdictions are less likely to require disclosure than 
any other federal appellate jurisdiction: the 3rd Circuit (p = 0.08), the 6th Circuit (p = 
0.02), and the 7th Circuit (p = 0.05).  
H. A Note on Priest-Klein 
Courts found a duty to disclose in approximately 51% of the cases in the sample. This 
statistic is consistent with the Priest-Klein litigation model, which implies that, because 
only close cases are likely to proceed to litigation (with clear cases being settled or never 
brought at all), “the formal structure of the law [will] appear indeterminate to any 
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scientific, empirical method of observing judicial decisions.”179  In other words, the 
model suggests that it is impossible to identify factors that significantly influence 
outcomes given that all litigated cases are perched on the knife-edge. In roughly half of 
the cases, they theorize, the outcome randomly falls to one side of the knife; in the other 
half, it randomly falls to the other side. 
For this reason, under the Priest-Klein model, our analysis is futile: if the model is 
truly predictive, then our analysis should fail to discover any significant drivers of 
outcomes. As the following Section reveals, however, nearly half of our independent 
variables significantly influence court decisions regarding whether the informed party 
had a duty to disclose information to the uninformed party.180 Therefore, we are left to 
explain these seemingly contradictory results (i.e., the finding of statistically significant 
factors that seem to drive outcomes (contrary to the Priest-Klein predictions) despite the 
fact that the outcomes are nearly evenly divided (consistent with the Priest-Klein 
predictions)).  
One could claim that our results are simply spurious. Given the pattern of our results, 
however, we do not believe this is the case. For example, the factors found to 
significantly influence outcomes do not appear to be random. Instead, we find that many 
of the  factors that significantly increase the probability that a court will impose a duty to 
disclose are also the most widely-accepted , such as the factors listed in the Restatements 
(i.e., whether the parties are in a fiduciary or confidential relationship, whether the 
information is related to a latent defect and whether the information would have updated 
or corrected previously disclosed information).181  
179 See Priest & Klein, supra note 111. 
180 See infra Section VI (describing results from the statistical analysis). 
181 See Restatement of  Contracts (2d) §161. 
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In addition, as a matter of theory, there are reasons to doubt that the Priest-Klein 
model holds when studying outcomes on the element of the duty to disclose in fraudulent 
silence claims.  In a fraudulent silence case, the imposition of a duty to disclose is only 
one element of a multi-element cause of action in which the plaintiff must also prove 
elements such as scienter, reliance, and materiality. As a result, even when the plaintiff 
can easily show that the defendant had a duty to disclose, the case nonetheless might 
proceed to the litigation and opinion stage due to the parties’ uncertainty about another 
element. As a result, cases in which the element of duty is on the knife-edge are but a 
subset of the cases in our sample; and, therefore, our regression analysis is able to 
identify factors that significantly influence outcomes on the duty element. 
Given that our analysis focuses on just one element -- duty -- of a multi-element 
cause of action -- fraudulent silence -- one might question why we don’t observe a larger 
majority of outcomes on the duty element favoring the plaintiff.182  It must be 
remembered, however, that plaintiffs may sometimes raise claims that they have a small 
probability of winning.  This is true, for example, of suits in which plaintiffs have one or 
more relatively strong claims, but can allege other, weaker, claims based on the same fact 
pattern.  Under such circumstances, the marginal cost of adding an additional weak claim 
to the suit is essentially zero.183  Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs’ success rate on 
the duty element could be less than 50%. For these reasons, that fact that we observe 50% 
of the outcomes on the duty element favoring the plaintiff might very well be anomalous 
and unrelated to the predictions of the Priest/Klein model.184 
182 One could argue that, if the duty element is not an element that is balanced on the knife-edge, then it 
must be an element on which the plaintiff is more likely to win. Otherwise, one might speculate that 
rational plaintiffs would not bring the case.  
183 For example, consider cases in which the plaintiff’s strongest claim is that the defendant affirmatively 
misrepresented a material fact. In cases such as these, the plaintiff might find that the marginal cost of 
adding even a weak claim to the suit alleging affirmative misrepresentation is essentially zero.  In other 
words, if the facts giving rise to an affirmative misrepresentation claim also give rise to an albeit weak 
fraudulent silence claim, then the plaintiff might tack on the weak fraudulent silence claim.  
184 See Shavell (demonstrating that any distribution of outcomes is supportable). [finish cite] 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
The question of when an individual in possession of valuable information unknown to 
her contracting partner has the right to remain silent and profit from her secret knowledge 
has fascinated scholars in philosophy, law, and history since ancient times.  Many have 
developed specific and general theories (what we term “meta-theories”) to explain the 
variation in case outcomes.  Few, however, have attempted to systematically analyze the 
cases and none has employed regression analysis to isolate the effect of particular factors 
on case outcomes. 
Our analysis casts doubt on much of the conventional wisdom regarding the law of 
fraudulent silence.  In fact, our results challenge ten of the most prominent theories that 
have been asserted to explain when courts will require full disclosure between contracting 
parties.  Specifically, our data do not support the contentions that courts more frequently 
require the disclosure of intrinsic information than extrinsic information; that courts insist 
on the disclosure of information that could prevent bodily injury or property damage; that 
informed parties are able to freely withhold information regarding personal intentions or 
opinions; that those seeking insurance, surety, or a release from liability must disclose all 
relevant information; that courts more frequently require disclosure in transactions 
relating to the sale or transfer of real property; that courts tend not to require the 
disclosure of deliberately acquired information; that courts have become more likely to 
require disclosure over time; or that southern states are less likely to require disclosure 
than are states in other regions of the country.   
However, in some cases, at least, it appears that the conventional wisdom is correct.  
Our data support the hypotheses that courts are more likely to require the disclosure of 
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latent, as opposed to patent, defects; that courts are more likely to require the disclosure 
of information that would update or correct previously disclosed information, that courts 
are more likely to require full disclosure between parties in a fiduciary or confidential 
relationship; that courts are more likely to require the disclosure of illegally or tortiously 
acquired information; and that courts are more likely to require disclosure when the 
uninformed party is a buyer or lessee.  
In addition, our own intuition that courts are swayed by the sympathetic nature of the 
uninformed party and the bad behavior of the informed party are supported by the data.  
Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the uninformed party is 
sick, disabled, illiterate, or elderly, though still competent to contract.  Also, courts are 
more likely to require disclosure when the informed party lied or told half-truths in the 
same transaction in which the omission occurred, or when the informed party took 
affirmative steps to conceal the withheld information.  However, our suspicion that courts 
are more likely to require disclosure when the uninformed party is female is not 
supported by the data, although our data did reveal a time trend in fraudulent silence 
decisions when the uninformed party is female.  The percentage of cases in which the 
uninformed party is female and the court required disclosure decreased significantly from 
the period 1793-1950 to the period 1951-2002. 
Perhaps most importantly, our analysis suggests that the long-standing and heated 
debate between those who argue that courts attempt primarily to enhance fairness by 
placing contracting parties on a more even playing field and those who argue that courts 
primarily attempt to enhance economic efficiency by allowing informed parties to reap 
the benefit of knowledge that is deliberately acquired is largely misplaced.  Our data 
provide little, if any, support for the contention that courts are more likely to require the 
disclosure of casually, as compared to deliberately, acquired information.  Regression 
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results do indicate that courts are more likely to require the disclosure of information 
when the parties lack equal access.  Our analysis, however, reveals that it is the presence 
of unequal access in combination with casually acquired information that drives case 
outcomes.  Therefore, it is the existence of these two factors together, rather than either 
one alone, that is a significant predictor of case outcomes. 
In the end, however, we view this study merely as a first step toward unraveling a 
difficult and controversial area of law, rather than a definitive answer to the question of 
what drives outcomes in fraudulent silence cases.  Although this study provides some 
answers, it raises many questions as well. 
For example, although our data show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, courts 
have become less likely over time to require the disclosure of material information 
unknown to one’s bargaining partner, does this mean that courts have become more pro-
defendant over time?  Or have other factors, such as the codification of certain areas of 
fraudulent silence law through statutes that mandate particular disclosures, altered the 
type of case that survives to litigation under the common law?185 
In addition, regression analyses on data spanning a two hundred year period do not 
permit us to capture the law at any particular point in time.  However, alternative 
strategies (such as, for example, using regression analysis over moving windows of 
smaller time periods) allow such an analysis.  Not only would this strategy more fully 
highlight any time trends in the data, but also it would permit testing for whether 
particular events or developments of note, such as, for example, the publication of the 
185 Common examples are statutes mandating certain disclosures in residential real estate transactions and 
car sales.  Because such statutes are generally pro-plaintiff, if these statutes merely codify changes that 
were already occurring under the common law, then the cases remaining to be decided under the common 
law could conceivably be those in areas of the law in which courts were not expanding disclosure duties.  
As a result, these cases would appear to reflect a pro-defendant trend that does not really exist. 
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Second Restatement of Contracts, actually produced changes in the law (as has been 
asserted by some commentators186), rather than simply restated the law. 
186 cite 
